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FOUNDING-ERA TRANSLATIONS OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION
Christina Mulligan, Michael Douma, Hans Lind, & Brian
Quinn
I. INTRODUCTION
After the United States Constitution was drafted in 1787, the
document was translated into German and Dutch for the
German- and Dutch-speaking populations of Pennsylvania and
New York.' Although copies of both the German- and Dutch-
* Christina Mulligan is an Assistant Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School. Michael
Douma is the Director of the Institute for the Study of Markets and Ethics at Georgetown
University. Hans Lind is a Giamatti Fellow at Yale University. Brian Quinn holds an M.A.
in Comparative Literature from the University of Chicago and a B.A. in English from
Harvard University. Where uncited, Dutch interpretations were completed by Michael
Douma and German interpretations were completed by Hans Lind. The authors wish to
thank Jack Balkin, William Baude, Randy Barnett, Randy Beck, Jud Campbell, Nathan
Chapman, Dan Coenen, Kent Dolphay, Richard Epstein Bill Glod, Christopher Green,
Jill Hasday, Jeanne Hoffman, Martin Kagel, Kurt Lash, Robert Leider, Michael
McConnell, Tim Meyer, Joe Miller, Thomas E. Mulligan, George Pike, Richard Re, Bo
Rutledge, Stephen E. Sachs, Frederick Schauer, Larry Solan, Larry Solum, Christian
Turner, Kirk Wetter, the faculty workshop participants at the University of Georgia, the
fellows of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, and the participants in the
Sixth Annual Hugh & Hazel Darling Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress
Conference. Special thanks to Michael Widener, Rare Book Librarian & Lecturer in Legal
Research at the Lillian Goldman Law Library at Yale Law School, for his invaluable
research help, without which this project could not have been completed.
1. The primary translations this Article will refer to are: VERFAHREN DER
VEREINIGTEN CONVENTION GEHALTEN ZU PHILADELPHIA, IN DEM JAHR 1787, UND
DEM ZWOLFTEN JAHR DER AMERICANISCHEN UNABHANGIGKEIT. AUF VERORDNUNG
DER GENERAL ASSEMBLY VON PENNSYLVANIEN AUS DEM ENGLISCHEN OBERSETZT
(Michael Billmeyer ed., presumed 1787) [hereinafter "U.S. CONST. (German)"j,
http://modern-constitutions.dc/US-00-1787-09-17-de-e.html; and CHARLES R. WEBSTER,
DE CONSTITUTIE, EENPARIGLYK GEACCORDEERD BY DE ALGEMEENE CONVENTIE,
GEHOUDEN IN DE STAD VON PHILADELPHIA, IN'T JAAR 1787: EN GESUBMITTEERD AAN
HET VOLK DER VEREENIGDE STAATEN VAN NOORD-AMERIKA, VERTAALD DOOR
LAMBERTUS DE RONDE, GEDRUCKT BY ORDER VAN DE FEDERAL COMMITTEE, IN DE
1
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language Constitutions have been preserved' and are reprinted in
a German collection of constitutions edited by Horst Dippel,'
they have largely escaped analysis until now.' This Article
examines the text of the translations and explains how they can
clarify the meaning of the Constitution's original text.
By presenting and analyzing translations of the Constitution,
this Article makes several modest but significant contributions to
the field of constitutional interpretation. Principally, the
translations provide evidence of the Constitution's original public
meaning-the meaning of the text as understood by its
contemporary translators and as reflected in their interpretive
choices. This evidence may be of particular value when studying
clauses in the Constitution that have not typically been the subject
of discussion and commentary. The translations also provide
examples of situations where there were multiple "original public
meanings"-where members of the public developed different
interpretations of the same text. More generally, this Article
proposes that translations constitute a uniquely advantageous
source of constitutional commentary by virtue of their ability to
comprehensively and contextually analyze the Constitution's text.
Unlike other sources, such as published pamphlets, the ratifiers'
STAD VAN ALBANY (1788) [hereinafter "U.S. CONST. (Dutch)"], http://modern-
constitutions.de/US-00-1787-09-17-nl-e.htm. Both documents are reprinted in 1
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD FROM THE LATE 18TH CENTURY TO THE MIDDLE OF
THE 19TH CENTURY (Horst Dippel ed., 2006) [hereinafter "1 DIPPEL"J.
2. An original copy of the German-language U.S. Constitution can be found at the
Lilly Library at Indiana University, Bloomington, and an original copy of the Dutch-
language U.S. Constitution is on file in the Historical and Special Collections of the
Harvard Law Library. See U.S. CONST. (German), http://www.modern-
constitutions.de/nbu.php?page-id=02alb5a86ffl39471 c0b1c57123ac196&show.doc=US-
00-1787-09-17-de&viewmodc=thumbview (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (stating that the Lilly
Library, Indiana University has made copies of the German translation of the U.S.
Constitution available); U.S. CONST. (Dutch), http://www.modern-
constitutions.de/nbu.php?page-id=02al b5a86ffl39471 c0bIc57f23ac196&show.doc=US-
00-1787-09-17-nl&viewmode=thumbview (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (stating that the
Historical and Special Collections of the Harvard Law Library has made copies of the
Dutch translation of the U.S. Constitution available).
3. 1 DIPPEL, supra note 1 (comprising the U.S. Constitution in English, German,
and Dutch, as well as each proposed amendment in English and German through 1810).
4. The German translation is so obscure that the Library of Congress website
appears to be unaware of its existence, incorrectly surmising that the Dutch translation was
the earliest publication of the Constitution in a non-English language. See Widespread
Interest in the Founding Documents, LIBR. OF CONGRESS., http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/
creating-the-united-states/constitution-legacy.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) ("Displayed
here is a 1788 copy of the Constitution in Dutch, perhaps the earliest example of its
publication in a language other than English.").
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speeches, or contemporary dictionaries, the translated
constitutions exhaustively restate every term and phrase in the
Constitution and represent those terms and phrases in context.
Part II will introduce the translations by situating them in
historical context. Part III will turn to the value of using
translations to interpret the Constitution in the present day. The
text of the translations will be analyzed in Part IV. Accompanying
this paper is also an appendix, which includes a table of the
English, Dutch, and German texts, together with extensive
annotations and notes on the peculiarities of these translations.'
Our aim is for these comments to be a helpful tool when using the
translations to explore the meaning of the Constitution.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION IN TRANSLATION
On September 17, 1787, the Philadelphia Constitutional
Convention adjourned after completing the drafting of the
Federal Constitution. By the next morning, 500 copies had been
printed in English, to be distributed to Congress, state governors,
and state legislators.'
Shortly after the convention adjourned, Pennsylvania's
congressional delegation requested a meeting with the
Pennsylvania General Assembly, the state's legislative body.'
Benjamin Franklin hoped that by quickly ratifying the
Constitution, Pennsylvania could secure the location of the new
nation's capital.' On Monday, September 24, 1787, and Tuesday,
September 25, 1787, the Pennsylvania assembly ordered the
printing of 3,000 copies of the Constitution in English and 1,500
copies of the Constitution in German "to be distributed
throughout th[e] state for the inhabitants thereof." 9 At the time,
5. See infra app.
6. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION,
1787-1788, at 27 (2010).
7. Id. at 59.
8. Id.
9. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OFTHE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
62-64 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) Ihereinafter DHRC II]. On September 24, Assemblyman
William Findlay moved that 3,000 copies be printed in English and 500 printed in German.
Id. at 62. Later in the day it appears Findlay moved for 1,000 copies to be printed in English
and 500 copies in German, and the motion "was agreed to." Id. at 63. The following day,
"jAssemblyman] Robert Whitehall[,] thinking the number, ordered [the previous dayl to
be published of the plan of the federal government, Iwasj too small I... moved to add two
32016]1
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around one-third of the population of Pennsylvania primarily
spoke German,o and the relative number of constitutions printed
in each language reflected this proportion. Assemblymen William
Will of Philadelphia, Adam Hubley of Lancaster County, and
Philip Kreemer of Berks County were appointed to a committee
to "engage a proper person to translate the plan [Constitution]
into the German language."" The assembly's German language
printing was undertaken by Michael Billmeyer. 1 2 However, the
translator's name does not appear on the Billmeyer copies" and
does not appear to be known.
The Dutch translation was produced separately at the
bequest of a pro-Constitution faction. In the late 1700s, the Dutch
language was still spoken widely in New York, specifically in the
rural areas around New York City "west of the Hudson, in New
Jersey, around Kingston, and along the upper reaches of the
Hudson and the Mohawk." 4 The Dutch translation was printed in
1788 to gather support for New York's ratification, "by Order van
de [of the] Federal Committee,"" a group which explicitly
advocated ratification of the Federal Constitution in New York."
The printer of the Dutch translation, Charles Webster, owner of
thousand more to that motion." Id. Assemblyman Hugh Brackenridge disagreed, arguing
that, "the number of fifteen hundred, ordered yesterday, would be enough to convey the
information generally through the state." Id. It was eventually ordered that "two thousand
copies in English and one thousand in German be printed in addition." Id. at 64. Adding
the totals from September 24 and September 25, it would appear that 3,000 copies were
printed in English and 1,500 were printed in German. Describing these events, Pauline
Maier wrote, "On Tuesday, September 25, the assembly ordered two thousand copies of
the Constitution printed in English and another thousand in German for distribution
throughout the state." MAIER, supra note 6, at 60. Maier did not mention the September
24 order.
10. According to the 1790 census, 160,000 of Pennsylvania's 434,373 inhabitants
were German, and this tongue "was the standard language in the area where the German
population was concentrated." Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on
American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269,310
(1992) (citing 2 ALBERT B. FAUST, THE GERMAN ELEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 14
(1909) and HEINZ KLOSS, THE AMERICAN BILINGUAL TRADITION 140 (1977)). See also
FRANK R. DIFFENDERFFER, THE GERMAN IMMIGRATION INTO PENNSYLVANIA (1977)
(explaining that most authorities agree that German speakers in Pennsylvania constituted
about one-third of the total population of Pennsylvania between 1730-1790).
11. DHRC II, supra note 9, at 57,63.
12. Id. at 64.
13. See U.S. CONST. (German),-supra note 1.
14. NICOLINE VAN DER SUS, COOKIES, COLESLAW, AND STOOPS: THE INFLUENCE
OF DUTCH ON THE NORTH AMERICAN LANGUAGES 34 (2009).
15. 1 DIPPEL, supra note 1, at 80.
16. MAIER, supra note 6, at 328.
4 [Vol. 31:1
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the Albany Gazette and Albany Journal, is notable for having
printed pamphlets by both the Anti-Federal and Federal
Committees. V
The Dutch translator was Lambertus De Ronde," a Dutch-
American minister of the Reformed Church in America (formally
known as the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church)." De Ronde
was born in Holland in 1720, and lived in the village of Zuilichem
in Gelderland for some period until 1746, before going to
Suriname. 20 He visited New York in 1750. Upon De Ronde's
arrival, he was approached by leaders of New York's Dutch
Reformed Church "who anticipated their congregation soon
would need another minister." 21 His preaching was praised as "so
pleasing" 2 2 that he was hired by the Collegiate Church "with the
understanding that he was to join the Coetus."23
The Coetus was the larger of two warring factions within the
Reformed Church; the other was known as the Conferentie.
Adrian C. Lieby describes the Conferentie as a group that "often
appeared to be moved by a violent hatred for all things
American." 24  Although "[t]he [C]onferentie sometimes
represented its battle as one to preserve the authority of
Amsterdam and the ways of the fathers in the American Dutch
church," Lieby claims that "its real objective was to oppose the
great religious revival that had swept the colonies in the thirty
years before the Revolution, . . . that has come to be called the
17. Id. at 333-34. On April 10, 1788, Webster printed a circular by the Anti-Federal
Committee raising over thirty objections to the Constitution-about ten days later he
published the Federal Committee's detailed rebuttal. Id.
18. 1 DIPPEL, supra note 1, at 80.
19. See EDWARD TANJORE CORWIN, A MANUAL OF THE REFORMED CHURCH IN
AMERICA (FORMERLY REFORMED PROTESTANT DUTCH CHURCH) 1628-1902, at 417
(4th ed. 1902).
20. Id.
21. See Joyce D. Goodfriend, The Cultural Metamorphosis of Domine Lambertus de
Ronde, HUDSON RIVER VALLEY REV., Spring 2009, at 63.
22. CORWIN, supra note 19, at 417.
23. Id. The Ecclesiastical Records of State of New York state that De Ronde was
hired "under condition of becoming a coetus." 6 ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 3495 (Edward Tanjore Corwin et al. eds., 1905) [hereinafter
ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS1.
24. ADRIAN C. LEIBY,THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN THE HACKENSACK VALLEY:
THE JERSEY DUTCH AND NEUTRAL GROUND, 1775-1783, at 20 (2d. ed. 1992). During the
Revolutionary War, most Conferentie supporters in the Hackensack Valley became
British loyalists. Id.
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'Great Awakening."'25 In the 1750s and 1760s, the Coetus faction
had adopted the liberal language of "rights" while emphasizing
personal religious revival. To the Conferentie, such talk seemed
to suggest that man could play a role in choosing his own
salvation. But any suggestion that God's grace was resistible, or
that man's free-will played a role in his own salvation, was
heretical to the Orthodox Calvinists, whose position on this
matter was defined at the Synod of Dordt from 1618-19. The
Conferentie were traditionalists who held strongly to Dordt, and
because Dordt determined the doctrines of the Dutch Reformed
Church in the Netherlands, the Conferentie maintained ties with
Amsterdam in order to counter what it envisioned were Arminian
(free-will) tendencies in the American church.26
Despite the expectations of De Ronde's appointment, he
never attended another Coetus meeting and, in 1755, became a
dedicated member of the rival Conferentie.27 Although De Ronde
had been a member of a committee that procured a preacher,
Archibald Laidlie, to preach in English, De Ronde "afterward
turned against him, and was the leading spirit of the 'Dutch
party"' which opposed English preaching."
25. Id.
26. See John W. Beardslee III, The American Revolution, in JAMES W. VAN
HOEVEN, PIETY AND PATRIOTISM 17-34 (1976).
27. CORWIN, supra note 19, at 417.
28. Id. at 418. Laidlie "organizeld] special meetings where women by themselves,
and men and youths by themselves expoundled] the Scriptures by turns, repeat[edj prayer
from memory, discussled] questions of conscience, etc." Letter from Rev. Lambertus De
Ronde to Rev. John Kalkoen, (Sept. 9, 1765), in ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS, supra note
23, at 4006. In a letter, De Ronde described the tension:
[Elver since the hour when a call was first extended to Rev. Laidlie, there has
been no [peacel in our congregation; that the Dutch party is much dissatisfied
with the English party, on account of the election of certain members of the
Consistory. These were chosen for the satisfaction of the (young) Americans,
because they had voted for an English-speaking minister. The Dutch party took
this very ill .... This quarrel has not abated at all since the arrival of Rev. Laidlic.
His Rev. was not willing to preach from Passion-texts, or holiday-sermons, as he
ought to have done; nor is he willing to be subordinate . . . . Furthermore, he
recommends that book of Marshall (on Sanctification), and gives utterance to
incautious expressions, peculiar opinions, both in and out of the pulpit. All these
things make matters worse, and cause many to fear that he will yet become an
Independent; especially because he has many adherents."
Id. Laidlie's all-female group "was perceived as a dangerous innovation by his orthodox
colleague, Lambertus De Ronde." Joyce D. Goodfriend, Incorporating Women into the
History of the Colonial Dutch Reformed Church: Problems and Proposals, in PATTERNS &
PORTRAITS: WOMEN IN THE HISTORY OF THE REFORMED CHURCH OF AMERICA 30
(Renee S. House & John W. Coakley eds., 1999).
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But church politics eventually spurred De Ronde to learn
English. In 1765, De Ronde reflected, "I had to learn a language,
against which I had an antipathy for twelve or thirteen years." 29
By the 1760s, he frequently preached in English, at one point
having to defend his practice of English preaching to the
Amsterdam Classis.
Although De Ronde learned to preach in English, he was
criticized for being "not in the least qualified" to do so.3 Historian
Joyce D. Goodfriend observes, "[h]ow widely De Ronde read in
English remains a matter of conjecture, but he clearly read well
enough to be conscious of contemporary English literary
conventions. Yet ... it is not surprising that he exhibited concern
about his comprehension of English."32 De Ronde described his
English-language book A System: Containing the Principles of
Christian Religion, Suitable to the Heidelberg Catechism as "a bold
Undertaking, by a person so little versed in the English
Language. ... [I]t would be Presumption to pretend to write it [in
English] with Ease and Elegance.",3 In another English-language
book, The True Spiritual Religion, he wrote that "flowers of
rethorick, fine style, fancy, wit, and such other ornaments" were
"more than my skill in the English language, could produce."3 4
The reception of De Ronde's work suggests that he
sometimes traded conscientiousness for speed. After printing his
book A System: Containing the Principles of the Christian
Religion, Suitable to the Heidelberg Catechism, De Ronde was
"admonished for leaving out an essential piece of doctrine" by the
Amsterdam Classis.35 De Ronde explained that "his eagerness to
see the work in print precluded sending the manuscript to
Amsterdam for approval" and that he would add an appendix to
the work containing the missing material."
While De Ronde was capable, he was not always held in high
praise, and he remained partial to the Dutch language and
customs. The Manual of the Reformed Church in America
29. Goodfriend, supra note 21, at 64.
30. See id. at 65-66.
31. Id. at 65.
32. Id. at 67.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 68.
35. Id. at 65.
36. Id.
2016] 7
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describes unattributed impressions of De Ronde: "He did not
possess as high a standard of character and usefulness as his
colleague, Ritzema, yet in many points, he was respectable." 37
However, given how much internal disagreement plagued the
Reformed Church, it is not surprising that anyone would get
mixed reviews. Goodfriend summarized De Ronde's complicated
professional and personal relationship with Dutch and American
culture.
De Ronde . . . cherished a vision of becoming a bicultural
intermediary between the church's parties, equally honored by
traditional Dutch artisans and worldly Anglicized merchants.
Thwarted in his design, he .. . cast himself as the vindicator of
the Dutch partisans in their struggle against the innovations of
the Anglicized Dutch.
Goodfriend ultimately laments others' "failure to acknowledge
De Ronde for what might be considered his heroic efforts to
bridge Dutch and English cultures."39
De Ronde reportedly stayed in New York City until 1785, at
which point he moved north to Schaghticoke, where he lived until
his death in 1795.40 However, a note by Rev. Thomas de Witt of
the Collegiate Dutch Reformed Church of New York indicates
that De Ronde "retired to the country when the British took over
[New York City] in 1776, and did not return to [his] charge at the
close of the war, but remained in retirement in [his] old age."41
Goodfriend similarly explains that De Ronde and his
contemporary, Ritzema, were "forcibly retired by a Consistory
under the control of Anglicizers." 42
According to William Elliot Griffis, popularizer of claims of
Dutch influence on early America, and author of the 1909 book
The Story of New Netherland: The Dutch in America, De Ronde's
translation of the Constitution into Dutch "had a tremendous
influence among older men of the State, backing Alexander
Hamilton, and securing New York for the Union and
37. CORWIN, supra note 19, at 417.
38. Good friend, supra note 21, at 70.
39. Id. at 63.
40. See 5 APPLETON'S CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 316 (James
Grant Wilson & John Fiske eds., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1888).
41. See I COLLECTIONS OF THE NEW YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY 391 (1841).
42. Goodfriend, supra note 21, at 69.
8 [Vol. 31:1
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Constitution."43 Nicoline van der Sijs claims, "[T]hanks to [De
Ronde's] translation, the Constitution received such strong
support from the older male population that the state of New
York came to accept it."" But neither author provides primary
sources to reinforce these claims, and the extent of the Dutch
translation's influence is presently unknown.
The exact date of printing is not recorded on the 1788 Dutch
translation of the Constitution, but it was presumably printed
before voting for convention delegates began on April 29.4
Eligibility to vote for convention delegates was not limited by
property requirements, and so any free white male over 21 could
vote." According to Pauline Maier, property-less voters tended to
vote Federalist. 47
When the votes to elect ratifiers were counted, the
Federalists had won nineteen seats, compared with the Anti-
Federalists' overwhelming forty-six." The Federalists had taken
New York (Manhattan), Kings (Brooklyn), Richmond (Staten
Island), and Westchester Counties; the Anti-Federalists had won
the rest.49
In light of the Federalists' poor showing at the delegates'
election, it is possible that Griffis's and Van der Sijs's views of the
positive impact of the Dutch translation has been expressed too
strongly. Few Federalist candidates were elected to the state
ratifying convention, and the change of heart among the elected
Anti-Federalist delegates is best explained by events following the
delegates' election. New York's ratifying convention began on
June 17, 1788.so By that time, eight states had already ratified the
Constitution. New York's Federalist delegates hoped that if a
ninth state ratified before the New York convention ended and
the new Constitution went into effect in the ratifying states, then
New York would be more likely to decide to stay with the union.
As hoped, New Hampshire ratified the Constitution on June 21,
43. WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFFIS, THE STORY OF NEW NETHERLAND: THE DUTCH IN
AMERICA 250 (1909).
44. Sius, supra note 14, at 35.
45. See generally MAIER, supra note 6, at 327.
46. Id. at 327, 341.
47. Id. at 341.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 348.
51. See id. at 342.
2016] 9
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and Virginia ratified the Constitution on June 26, 1788. News of
these two events reached the New York convention while it was
still in session and tipped the balance in favor of ratification,
53despite the strong Anti-Federalist presence.
Notably, a copy of the German translation of the
Constitution is "bound up in the same volume" as the Dutch
translation in the State Library of New York." It was printed
under the same authority and is of the same date and imprint as
De Ronde's translation." This German translation was identical
to the Billmeyer print, and the translator's name is again
omitted."
III. THE INTERPRETIVE VALUE OF TRANSLATIONS
A. TRANSLATION AS ANALYSIS
Part of the reason we consult the works of prominent late
eighteenth-century commentators to understand the Constitution
is "because they reflect the considered analyses of intelligent
observers far closer to the relevant events [of the Founding] than
we are today."" De Ronde and the German translator were
similarly-situated, intelligent members of the late eighteenth-
century American polity, but one might question whether their
52. DHRC II, supra note 9, at 23.
53. See generally MAIER, supra note 6, at 376.
54. CORWIN, supra note 19, at 418-19. See generally John P. Kaminski, New York:
The Reluctant Pillar, in THE RELUCTANT PILLAR: NEW YORK AND THE ADOrION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Stephen L. Schechter ed., 1985). See also Gregory E.
Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the
United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 832-33 (2007).
55. CORWIN, supra note 19, at 418-19.
56. 1 DIPPEL, supra note 1, at 64 n.1 (noting that the Billmeyer print is identical to
the 1788 Charles Webster print).
57. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (1998). In other words, "these works are
simply good constitutional commentary by members who were or nearly were members of
the political community within which the Constitution was adopted." Vasan Kesavan &
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting
History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1178 (2003). To the extent that the original understanding of
the ratifiers is considered significant, the translations are additionally relevant to those
questions, as there is a good chance that some ratifiers in Pennsylvania and New York had
seen the translations. Notably, the chairman of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, was the son of a German Lutheran pastor and had
studied in Germany for many years. See Oswald Scidensticker, Frederick Augustus Conrad
Muhlenberg, Speaker of the House of Representatives, in the First Congress, 1789, 2 PENN.
MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 184, 184-85, 202 (1889).
[Vol. 31:1
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translations represent "considered analyses" such as those printed
in a pamphlet or articulated in a speech. For their translations to
possess the exegetical value associated with contemporary
commentary and debate, their work would need likewise to have
an analytical component, or more precisely, for their thought
process to include an analytic step.
On this point, there is virtually unanimous consensus among
textual scholars and linguists who compose the field of translation
studies: no substantive epistemological difference exists between
a commentary and a translation. Translation entails, and always
has entailed, a process of analysis. Although this claim is intuitive,
establishing it is not trivial. The competing possibility-that
translation is some rote process, where word A in the source
language becomes word A' in the target-comes readily to mind.
But on the contrary, analysis and commentary is a necessary
part of translation. Indeed, certain scholars describe translation as
"reported speech."" Even the earliest canonical mention of
translation in the Western tradition- Cicero's account of
adapting Greek drama into his native Latin-describes the
translator digesting the source language and expressing it, as he
saw fit, in the target language.5 9 Consider an example of
translation from Roman Jakobson, the most prominent member
of the Russian formalist school of linguistics. In Jakobson's
example, a writer is trying to translate the English sentence "She
has brothers" (not, it will be noted, a grammatically complex
concept in English) into another language, such as Arabic, that
recognizes not only a singular and a plural, but also a dual form. 6
Does the writer here use the plural form, knowing that this
denotes at least three brothers, or the dual, which limits the total
to two? Or perhaps it may be more desirable to write around the
problem, translating the sentence less than literally ("She has
more than one brother"), or else express the idea in Arabic with
great precision but little grace ("She has two or more than two
brothers")? Whichever option the writer chooses, the translation
of even this simple sentence necessarily becomes an interpretive
act, with a variety of possible consequences. In one case, the
58. Roman Jakobson, On Linguistic Aspects of Translation, in THE TRANSLATION
STUDIES READER 114 (Lawrence Venuti ed., 2000).
59. See Cicero, De Oratore, in WESTERN TRANSLATION THEORY FROM
HERODOTUS TO NIETZSCHE (Douglas Robinson ed., 2002).
60. Jakobson, supra note 58, at 114.
2016] 11
12 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY
translator may make an error-such as by using the plural form
when the dual would have been correct. In another, there may not
be a fact of the matter about how many brothers the woman has,
and the translator may choose to create a more precise meaning
an author did not intend. In yet another case, the translator may
know from another source how many brothers the woman has,
and correctly add this fact in the translation, supplementing a
reader's substantive understanding of a situation.
In many other cases, the analytic act will not be so obvious.
In the vast majority of cases, in fact, it is trivial. As Jakobson puts
it, "Languages differ essentially in what they must convey and not
in what they may convey."" Arabic must convey a distinction
between two and more than two, while English may do so.
However, many expressions in English and Arabic are exactly
alike in what they must convey. The translation of any number of
common concepts (numbers, conjunctions such as "and" and
"or," many adjectives, etc.) may be essentially verbatim.
Crucially, though, this does not mean that a translation is a simple
word-to-word or phrase-to-phrase match. To determine that
concepts are equivalent in two languages and can be verbatim-
translated is, itself, a cognitive or analytic step. To recognize areas
where analysis is required means recognizing the ones where they
are not; we drive through green lights not because we fail to notice
them, but because we have seen they are not red.
Taking these considerations to a more abstract level, the
interpretative nature of translation follows from the realization
that languages are neither isomorphic nor congruent to one
another. As Ferdinand de Saussure pointed out, languages differ
not only in the vocabulary they use to denote a certain concept
(the "signifier"), but also in their conceptual way of slicing the
world, leading to an inevitable incongruence that necessarily
affects any act of translation. And as we have seen in the case of
the "brothers" in Arabic, some languages might not only
presuppose a different division of the world into mental concepts,
but also are richer in vocabulary than others. Consequently, the
translator's task does not always consist of choosing the
correlating signifier in a different language, but often consists of
choosing a more or less close approximation. If the target
language is more limited, compromises in conveying the original
61. Id. at 116.
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meaning will be inevitable. If the target language is richer, the
necessity of interpretative choices also arises: ambivalences in the
source are not conveyable in this case, but instead need to be
decided by the translator. A translator's choice for a certain, even
non-corresponding or only partially corresponding correlate in
the former case is as meaningful as a translator's choice to clear
up an ambivalence of the source text in the latter. Both can be
understood as a commentary on the source text. And even in cases
of congruency of two languages (an unlikely case, since even in
etymologically-related languages, shifts of meaning over time will
lead to incongruence), the fact that a single word usually has a
number of meanings that need to be distinguished still requires an
act of interpretation when selecting the adequate semantic
correlate. Additionally, in light of Wittgenstein, modern
linguistics has moved away from the idea that a word has one or a
number of fixed meanings, and instead defines the meaning of a
word solely by its context of use, necessarily rendering any
translation an interpretation of a source-text.
Synthesizing three centuries of European philosophy, from
Schleiermacher and Hegel to Heidegger, George Steiner
advanced a theory of translation that described it as the
"hermeneutic motion"-the very name of which describes
translation as a process of analysis (hermeneutics) that precedes
bringing a text into another language (the motion)." Indeed, even
in one of the most rigorous and precise of all hermeneutic
traditions-Talmudic scholarship-it is assumed that "every
translation is always a commentary."" De Ronde's and the
unknown German's translations constitute, therefore,
commentaries or "considered analyses" -an additional source to
access the original public meaning of the Constitution as
translated in the late 1780s.6
62. See George Steiner, The Hermeneutic Motion, in THE TRANSLATION STUDIES
READER 156 (Lawrence Venuti ed., 2000). Similarly, Lawrence Lessig has noted that
"Itihe translator's task is always to determine how to change one text into another text,
while preserving the original text's meaning. And by thinking of the problem faced by the
originalist as a problem of translation, translation may teach something about what a
practice of interpretive fidelity might be." Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1165, 1173 (1993).
63. Jacob Neusner, Translation and Paraphrase: The Differences and Why They
Matter, 27 HEBREw STUD. 26,35 (1986).
64. Besides these texts' exegetical value as commentary lies a further issue for the
political theorist to chew on. If the government that was created at the state ratifying
conventions was the government as the public understood it, then the Dutch and German
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B. A CONTEXTUAL AND COMPREHENSIVE SOURCE
The German and Dutch translations of the Constitution are
not merely a source to aid constitutional interpretation; they are
also a new kind of source, one that possesses the unique quality
of being both contextual and comprehensive. The translations are
contextual because each translated term is understood in relation
to the rest of the clause and document in which it appears, rather
than in isolation. They are comprehensive because they restate
each and every term and phrase in the Constitution, rather than
just those of interest.65
In contrast, consider the other types of textual sources that
one might look to in order to discover the Constitution's meaning
to the Founding-era public. Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes
Paulsen enumerate:
(1) the public (and sometimes private) writings of the
Federalists and Anti-Federalists; (2) the public debates of the
state ratifying conventions; (3) the early congressional,
executive, and judicial interpretations of the Constitution; (4)
the works of early commentators on the Constitution;
and ... (5) the secret drafting history of the Constitution.6 6
Consulting commentary such as these for perspectives on the
constitutional text's meaning is a part of the constitutional
interpreter's toolkit. 67 But these sources all present one notable
limitation: rarely, if ever, does any single analysis purport to
exhaustively treat an entire text- the entirety of the
Constitution-in a consistent level of detail. As a result, the
translations could be understood as not just commentaries but as direct delineations of the
contours of government, along with the English-language text. Alternatively, if one
understands the creation of the federal government as an act of the states' ceding
sovereignty, the German translation would play a particularly significant role. Because the
German translation was authorized by the government of Pennsylvania for the purpose of
helping the people of Pennsylvania decide whether to become part of the new United
States, then the powers Pennsylvania ceded are specified in both the English- and German-
language documents it published.
65. See DAVID BELLOS, Is THAT A FISH IN YOUR EAR?: TRANSLATION AND THE
MEANING OF EVERYTHING 107 (2011) (stating that "unlike ordinary readers, Itranslatorsl
are not allowed to skip.").
66. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 57, at 1125-26.
67. See PHILLIP BOBBIlT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 7 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195-99 (1987).
68. Moreover, many constitutional clauses were not debated widely in the public.
Kevasan & Paulsen, supra note 57, at 1164 (remarking that "many issues and clauses simply
were not discussed at the state ratifying conventions").
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work of any one commentator, while explicating the meaning of a
certain section of text, does not always situate it comparatively
with respect to all other relevant parts of the text. In short,
commentaries on the Constitution's text are contextual-they
analyze the text in context-but are rarely if ever truly
comprehensive.'
By contrast, the one common source that provides a
potentially comprehensive reference for all possible terms-a
contemporary dictionary-applies to the language in general, but
not to the specific constitutional context.7 o Further work must be
done to determine which of several dictionary definitions, if any,
is an appropriate explanation of a term as used in the Constitution
or whether a term had acquired some specialized or technical
meaning."
The translated constitutions thus boast a unique advantage
that is not shared by other sources: they exhaustively restate every
term and phrase in the Constitution and represent those terms
and phrases in context. Unlike published pamphlets, the ratifiers'
speeches, or contemporary dictionaries, these translations are
both contextual and comprehensive. As such, the translated
constitutions may be not only valuable but uniquely valuable to at
least certain investigations into original public meaning.
69. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747,748 (1999)
("By viewing the document's clauses in splendid isolation from each other-by reducing a
single text to ajumble of disconnected clauses-readers may miss the significance of larger
patterns of meaning at work.").
70. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 57, at 1202.
71. See Gregory E. Maggs,A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding
Era to Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 358,
373 (2014). Maggs describes several of the challenges of using a dictionary to resolve the
meaning of a term in the Constitution in the excerpt below:
First, the definition might come from the wrong kind of dictionary. A definition
from an English language dictionary may be inapplicable to a constitutional term
that has a specialized legal meaning, and, vice versa, a definition from a legal
dictionary may be inapplicable to a constitutional term used in a non-specialized
way. Second, even if the proper kind of dictionary is consulted, if the dictionary
contains multiple definitions for the same word, some of these meanings ascribed
to the word may not apply to the word as it is used in the particular context of the
Constitution. Third, dictionary definitions do not always capture the correct
meaning of words that form a part of a phrase or compound, such as "Vice
President" or "declare war."
Id.
72. The translations may be particularly helpful for producing intratextualist
interpretations of the Constitution. Intratextual interpretation involves "the interpreter
tr[ying] to read a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of
another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase."
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As sources, they are hardly perfect. For instance, as the
appendix reveals, the translations occasionally contain clear
mistakes-in addition to potentially other more subtle errors-
that obscure the translator's actual understanding.3 Moreover,
discovering a slippage of meaning in the translation of the English
to the Dutch or German versions is just half the battle; a
researcher would need to analyze the public meaning of the Dutch
or German terms of interest as well, requiring specialized
knowledge and research. One would also need to posit the degree
to which a difference in meaning was a choice made based on the
translator's understanding of the English text, or a choice based
on other values such as style or brevity at the expense of precision.
Despite these challenges, the existence of multiple language
translations of the Constitution has the potential to clarify rather
than muddy the document's meaning. In a related context,
Lawrence Solan has argued that the European Union's practice
of referencing multiple, equally-authentic translations of
European legislation actually can increase confidence in the texts'
*74
meanings.
Sometimes a particular translation has captured [a point], but
at other times, reading the various translations suggests a
common theme, expressed in different words by each
translator . .. [t]he ability to compare different versions and
then to triangulate . . . brings out nuances that can help the
investigator to qin additional insight into the thoughts of the
original drafter.
The same potential to "triangulate" is present here.
See Amar, supra note 69, at 748.
73. See Maggs, supra note 71, at 379 (observing that"... mistakes happen. Creating
a dictionary is difficult work that requires detailed knowledge about a great many things.
The lexicographer has very limited time to spend on any individual word, and it is easy to
make a mistake, especially with difficult words").
74. See Lawrence M. Solan, The Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes by the
European Court of Justice, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 294-300 (2009). Others have argued
the intuitive position that "adding language versions to a single body of law can only be a
source of confusion." Lawrence M. Solan, Multilingualism and Morality in Statutory
Interpretation, 1 LANGUAGE & L./LINGUAGEM E DIREITO 5, 7 (2014); Janny Leung,
Statutory Interpretation in Multilingual Jurisdictions: Typology and Trends, 33 J.
MULTILINGUAL& MULTICULTURAL DEv. 481 (2012).
75. Solan, The Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes, supra note 74, at 292-93.
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IV. THE TRANSLATIONS
The early German and Dutch translations of the Constitution
speak to numerous constitutional debates, several of which are
discussed at length below because of their particular significance.
Other clauses are briefly annotated in the appendix
accompanying this Article.
The cost of this broad treatment is a lack of depth. Any full
exegesis of the translations would require delving deeply into the
original public meaning of not just the English language, but the
Dutch and German language as well. Whole articles and books
have been written about single words in the original Federal
Constitution. We do not pretend to be able to speak
authoritatively about the entire translated document in a single
Article. Nonetheless, we provide brief explorations of key phrases
and terms as illustrations of how the translations were rendered
and as guideposts for further analysis.
The authors are also keenly aware that the act of describing
the Dutch and German texts in English introduces further
opportunity to misunderstand what the translators believed they
were writing. We have worked to minimize this problem by
relying on scholars who regularly work with late eighteenth-
century German and Dutch texts. Nonetheless, as noted above,
every translation is also a commentary. It is a given that different
readers may reasonably disagree on the meaning of the Dutch and
German texts-as they do already when analyzing the
Constitution in English.
Before considering specific clauses, several notes may be
made about the translations as a whole. De Ronde's Dutch
translation is notable for how closely it tracks the English-
language Constitution. As Dippel describes, "This Dutch
translation has a special flavor due to the fact that [De Ronde], a
Dutch-American, followed the original phrasing very closely,
readily adopting English terms when no Dutch equivalent seemed
to be at hand, which sometimes renders the translation difficult to
understand for a Dutchman."" On the one hand, De Ronde is
concerned with producing a translation for a particular Dutch-
American audience, not a Dutch-speaking audience in the
Netherlands. He could then assume of his audience some
76. See infra app.
77. 1 DIPPEL, supra note 1, at 84 n.1.
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familiarity with English words and American phrases. By
adhering closely to the literal meaning of the Constitution and
keeping the cognate translation wherever possible (instead of say,
using a synonymous non-cognate of the English word), De Ronde
was also preparing his audience for a future in which they would
need to understand American legal terms in their American
context. By using cognates, even when these words were
uncommon in Dutch, De Ronde found an easy path to providing
a translation that did not have to struggle between choosing the
most precise and most common Dutch equivalent of the English
text."
The German translation of the Constitution used here is a
Michael Billmeyer print. 9 According to Dippel, it is not identical
to "the first two German translations" which appeared in the
Gemeinniitzige Philadelphische Correspondenz on September 25,
1787, or to a translation in Neue Unpartheyische Lancaster
Zeitung, printed on September 26, 1787.80 However, the Billmeyer
text was commissioned by the Pennsylvania General Assembly,
was distributed among the German-speaking population of
Pennsylvania, and is identical to three contemporary editions of
the translation by Matthias Bortgis in 1787, Charles Webster in
1788, and Melchior Steiner in 1788.
Although not much is known about the German translator, a
number of things can be deduced about his person from this
translations. As did De Ronde, he followed the original phrasing
of the Constitution very closely, sometimes even adopting English
terms when a German equivalent would have been at hand. He
likely did not, or did not always, use a dictionary, since some of
his translations are not the obvious choice, and the words he chose
are often not the ones contemporary dictionaries list.' There is
78. Cognates that appear in De Rondc's translation include "privilegic" for
"privilege" (art. I, § 9, cl. 2); "bill van attainder" for "bill of attainder" and "cx post facto
wet" for "cx post facto law" (art. 1, § 9, cl. 3); "publijke" for "public" and "judgen" for
"judges" (art. II, § 2, cl. 2); "trial" for "trial" (art. III, § 2, cl. 2); and "corruptic van blocd"
for "corruption of blood" (art. III, § 3, cl. 2). U.S. CONST. (Dutch), supra note 1.
79. U.S. CONST. (German), supra note 1; 1 DIPPEL, supra note 1, at 64 n.1.
80. 1 DIPPEL, supra note 1, at 64 n.1.
81. Id.
82. If the German translator used a dictionary, it was likely outdated at the time of
translation since some of the words he chose were antiquated. The translator's choices
were compared to: THE ENGLISH CELLARIUS; OR A DICTIONARY ENGLISH AND
GERMAN CONTAINING THE ENGLISH WORDS IN THEIR ALPHABETICAL ORDER AND
DERIVATION (1768); JOHN BARTHOLOMEW ROGLER, A DICTIONARY ENGLISH,
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some evidence that allows one to conclude that he was a German
native speaker: his word use is elevated, and especially when it
comes to more technical terms he seems not to have consulted a
dictionary, since it is mostly in these cases when his chosen words
are far from what the dictionaries of the time would have listed.
Some of his vocabulary however seems to be dated, again
especially when it comes to technical terms of law and commerce.
In one curious instance, he even uses a word that was only
common in a very few regions in Germany.83 There is much more
than a basic knowledge of grammar present,' although the
translator often chooses to ignore it when it comes into conflict
with his verbatim, metaphrasing style. 5 Yet despite the
translator's command of German grammar, he makes some errors
that would be surprising for a native speaker. For example, he
sometimes translates "for" as "vor," even though the correct translation
GERMAN AND FRENCH CONTAINING NOT ONLY THE ENGLISH WORDS IN THEIR
ALPHABETICAL ORDER, TOGETHER WITH THEIR SEVERAL SIGNIFICATIONS; BUT ALSO
THEIR PROPER ACCENT, PHRASES, FIGURATIVE SPEECH, IDIOMS, AND PROVERBS, By
MR. CHRISTIAN LUDWIG Now CAREFULLY REVISITED, CORRECTED, AND
THROUGHOUT AUGMENTED WITH MORE THAN 12,000 WORDS, TAKEN OUT OF
SAMUEL JOHNSON'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY AND OTHERS (3d ed., Leipzig, 1763);
VOLLSTANDIGES WORTERBUCH DER ENGLISCHEN SPRACHE FOR DIE DEUTSCHEN
NACH DEM NEUESTEN UND BESTEN HOLFSMITITELN MIT RICHTIG BEZEICHNETER
AUSSPRACHE EINES JEDEN WORTES BEARBEITET VON JOHANNES EBERS. . . (Leipzig,
Johann Gottlob Immanuel Breitkopf, Sohn und Compagnie 1794); A COMPLEAT
ENGLISH-GERMAN, GERMAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY THE FIRST VOLUME CONTAINING
THE ENGLISH-GERMAN PART, HEREIN NOT ONLY THE WORDS TO BE MET WITH IN
OTHER DICTIONARIES, MAY BE FOUND, BUT ALL EXPRESSIONSOF NATURAL HISTORY,
HUSBANDRY, MARINE, MERCHANDISE; THE LAW AND ITS COURTS THE VULGAR
TONGUE AND PROVINCIALISMS ARE INSERTED BY JOHN CHRISTIAN FLICK (Hamburg,
1803); A NEW ENGLISH-GERMAN AND GERMAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY CONTAINING
ALL THOESE WORDS IN GENERAL USE, DESIGNATING THE VARIOUS PARTS OF SPEECH
IN BOTH LANGUAGE WITH THE GENDERS AND PLURALS OF THE GERMAN NOUNS.
COMPETED FROM THE DICTIONARIES OF LLOYD, NOHDEN, FLOGEL, AND SPORSCHIL IN
Two VOLUMES (Philadelphia, George W. Mentz & Son 1835). The latter is a more recent
dictionary, but since there was a custom to integrate earlier dictionaries of other authors
into one's own dictionary, these later, more extensive, eclectic dictionaries are an
important source for earlier use.
83. The translator uses the word "zween," which is the male variant of "two," which
is only common in some regions of Germany. It could however also be a typo ("zween"
instead of "zweien"), but the grammatical case and the gender match better in the case of
"zween."
84. The translator's command of German is on display when using the correct
genitive case; the correct position of the verb and auxiliary verb is also frequently chosen -
something non-native speakers often have difficulty with.
85. Metaphrase is the word-for-word, line-for-line rendering of a text, as contrasted
with paraphrase. See Lessig, supra note 62, at 1193-94 (citing WILLIAM FROST, DRYDEN
AND THE ART OF TRANSLATION 1 (1955) (citations omitted)).
20 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY
would be "fdr."
Whether the translator was a lawyer or legal scholar is
unclear. On the one hand, this seems doubtful since it is here
where his German vocabulary occasionally fails.86 On the other
hand he is willing to paraphrase and extensively explain legal
terminology that juridical laymen might fail to understand. For
example, "naturalization" is paraphrased as "Ertheilung des
Btirgerrechts" ("the granting of a citizen's right"), although a
German cognate, "Naturalisation" existed at the time." "Letters
of Marque and Reprisal" is also imperfectly paraphrased, as "sich
zu verteidigen und Repressalien zu gebrauchen, zu ertheilen"
("authorizations to defend oneself and to use reprisals"). 8 "Bill
of Attainder or ex post facto Law" is rewritten in the German
translations: "No Law, that declares someone guilty without
forensic conviction (court decision), or that will be made after the
deed [has been] committed and that declares someone guilty, shall
be made."" The phrase "work Corruption of Blood" is explained
as "soll sich iber die Anverwandten erstrecken" ("shall extend to
its relatives").'
What is contradictory in the German translation is that
despite the translator's general verbatim style, his habit of using
cognates even in cases where this rather hinders understanding,
and his close adherence to the structure of the original draft even
when it comes to the sentence structure, he is also occasionally
willing, without apparent cause, to depart from his closer
translation, paraphrasing and choosing more ill-fitting words
when closer ones (even cognates) were available. His attempt to
keep the sentence structure of the original text and at the same
time to obey the most basic rules of German grammar creates
monstrous hybrids that, especially when it comes to longer
passages, are hard to understand even for a German reader. In
rare occasion, the translated sentence is distorted so severely that
86. In the late 1700s, constitutions were a relatively new idea in Germany, as they
were mainly a product of the Enlightenment. Most of the German constitutions did not
come into effect until the early nineteenth century, which might explain some of the
translator's verbal clumsiness when describing a democratic legislative process. There was
also a persistent tradition of using Latin instead of German technical terms in the legal
context.
87. U.S. CONST. (German), supra note 1, art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
88. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
89. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
90. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
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the meaning can only be reconstructed by using the surrounding
context. These observations, as well as the fact that the translator
does not seem concerned about whether using a cognate is the
best choice from a semantic perspective, might indicate laziness
or a need for expediency as a cause to the translation's
peculiarities; it must have been simpler to use cognates, translate
line by line, sentence by sentence, half-sentence by half-sentence,
and occasionally adjust the grammar to the German rules, than to
change the sentence structure in a way to facilitate understanding.
That time pressure or laziness affected the translation is further
supported by his permitting the monstrous sentences he created
to remain in the translation, as well as the fact that some of the
more ill-fitting word-choices he made might be the result of failing
to consult a dictionary. On the other hand, there seemed to be a
willingness to explain some hard-to-understand legal terms
extensively and adequately, and by this make these parts of the
Constitution understandable for the general public. Both his
consistency as well as his inconsistencies are noteworthy; they
have to be taken in account when the translator's choices are used
to interpret the original meaning of the English original.
A. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
English German Dutch
To regulate Commerce Die Handelschaft mit Om de koopmanschap te
with foreign Nations, auswartigen Nationen, und regulceren met
and among the several unter den verschiedenen buitenlandsche natien, en
States, and with the Staaten und mit den Indianer onder de onderscheiden
Indian Tribes .... Stammen, einzurichten . ... staaten, alsook met de
Indiaansche volkeren .. . .
One of the most heated debates in constitutional
interpretation concerns the scope of power granted to Congress
under the Commerce Clause. In the past several decades, the
Supreme Court has considered whether this clause grants
Congress the power to mandate that every person acquire health
* ~91 **insurance, to criminalize growing marijuana for one's own
91. See Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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92* *.private consumption, to criminalize certain acts of violence
against women,9 and to enact higher penalties for carrying a gun
near a school. 94 In each of these cases, the question before the
courts was whether Congress's law constituted a permissible
regulation of commerce or whether Congress had acted beyond
the scope of its limited powers.
Two of the more popular interpretations of the clause are
represented by the work of Randy Barnett and Jack Balkin.
Barnett views the original meaning of the clause as instantiating a
notably limited power. In 2001, he canvased a wide variety of
Founding-era documents including contemporary dictionaries,
records of the constitutional conventions, the Federalist Papers,
and early judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause. 95 He
concluded that, although the term 'commerce' had a variety of
meanings, in the context of the constitutional clause, commerce
"means the trade or exchange of goods (including the means of
transporting them)."9 Barnett also concluded the verb "to
regulate" meant "'to make regular'-that is, to specify how an
activity may be transacted -when applied to domestic commerce,
but also included the power to make 'prohibitory regulations'
when applied to foreign trade."9
Jack Balkin maintains that a broader understanding of
'commerce' is appropriate. He argues that "[t]o have commerce
with someone meant to converse with them, mingle with them,
associate with them or trade with them . . . . The contemporary
meanings of intercourse and commerce are far narrower than their
eighteenth-century meanings."9 8 "If we want to capture the
original meaning of 'commerce,' we must stop thinking primarily
in terms of commodities. We must focus on the ideas of
interaction, exchange, sociability, and the movement of persons
that business (in its older sense of being busy or engaged in
affairs) exemplifies."'
92. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
93. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
94. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
95. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 112-30,132-35, 139-40 (2001).
96. Id. at 146; see also id. at 112-30 (describing the meaning of commerce in a variety
of sources from the Founding-era and later periods).
97. Id. at 146.
98. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 149 (2011).
99. Id at 151.
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The German translation seems to reflect a midpoint between
Barnett and Balkin's interpretations. When translating
"Commerce" the translator had a number of choices:
'Commercium,' 'Kaufmannschaft,' 'Handel,' 'Handlung,' and
'Handelschaft.' He chose the last, 'Handelschaft,' a term that at
the time already had become outmoded. 01 Both Kruenitz,'" an
eighteenth-century encyclopedia edited between 1773 and 1858
and Adelung,10 ' an eighteenth-century German critical dictionary
edited between 1793 and 1810, define 'Handelschaft' as the
business of exchanging goods with the purpose of profit.
The root word of 'Handelschaft' is 'Handel,' which in its
general meaning was very close to the English 'handling.'
However, when used in the context of commerce, 'Handel' was
understood "to broadly comprise any activity which creates a
noteworthy change in an object"'a so long as the activity was
directed to profit."1 5 In its common use, however, the term was
usually limited "to (ex-)change of property."" Used as a
100. "[D]as Commercium" or "das Kommerz" (the latter rather referring to
covenants or contracts in general)-which denotes the traffic of goods in general, and
therefore is often understood as synonymous to "Handel." However, 'Handel' appears to
be used much less frequently. See GOETHE-WORTERBUCH, HG. V. DER BERLIN-
BRANDENBURGISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN (1978) (discussing
"Kommerz" and "Commercium"); see also 1 JOHANN CHRISTOPH ADELUNG,
GRAMMATISCH-KRITISCHES WORTERBUCH DER HOCHDEUTSCHEN MUNDART MIT
BESTANDIGER VERGLEICHUNG DER OBRIGEN MUNDARTEN, BESONDERS AB3ER DER
OBERDEUTSCHEN. ZWEYTE, VERMEHRTE UND VERBESSERTE AUSGABE at col. 1342 (2d
ed. 1970) (1793-1801).
101. According to ADELUNG, supra note 100, 'Handelschaft' was an antiquated term
in the late eighteenth century. Instead, 'Handel' or 'Handlung' would be used.
'Handelschaft' is also a peculiar choice because even contemporary English-German
dictionaries list 'Handel' or 'Handlung' as the translation for 'commerce.' See supra note
82.
102. JOHANN GEORG KRUENITZ: OECONOMISCHE ENCYCLOPADIE ODER
ALLGEMEINES SYSTEM DER LAND-, HAUS- UND STAATS-WIRTHSCHAFT: IN
ALPHABETISCHER ORDNUNG 1-242 (Berlin, Pauli 1785).
103. 1 ADELUNG, supra note 100.
104. In the original commentary, "jede thatige aullere Veranderung, Nahrung und
Zeitliches Vermogen zu erwerben." 2 ADELUNG, supra note 100, col. 946.
105. Id. A different dictionary makes a distinction between 'Handel' and 'Handlung.'
'Handel' refers to selling or buying goods by merchants and hucksters whereas 'Handlung'
is the term for the full field of the merchants' trade, also comprising the trade of bills. See
generally S.J.E. STOSCH, PREDIGER ZU LODERSDORF VERSUCH IN RICHTIGER
BESTIMMUNG EINIGER GLEICHBEDEUTENDER WORTER DER DEUTSCHEN SPRACHE
ZWEYTER THEIL. FRANKFURT AN DER ODER, VERLEGTS ANTON GOTIFRIED BRAUNS
WITEWE (Wien, Eblen 1772).
106. 2 ADELUNG, supra note 100, col. 946. Kruenitz understands 'Handel' in its more
specific meaning as the "business of the merchant." See KRUENITZ, supra note 102.
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collectivum, when the exchange of goods is someone's business,
'Handel' and 'Handelschaft'-the term the German print uses-
become synonymous.
From this evidence, we can draw the contours of the term's
meaning. 'Handelschaft' denotes the full field of the merchants'
trade, comprising exchanging goods for goods or bills, and
possibly including the shipment and transportation of goods."o
This meaning also opens up the possibility that 'commerce'
comprises the larger scope of actions and interactions of persons
involved in business.
The German translator could have made a different choice
here: 'Kaufmannschaft,' the German cognate to the term the
Dutch translation uses ('Koopmanschap'). This term would have
had a more narrow meaning, particularly according to S.J.E.
Stosch, an eighteenth-century clergyman who is known for his
meditations on word use. Stosch limits 'Kaumfannschaft' solely to
the exchange of goods for money, whereas 'Handelschaft' or
'Handlung' is said to be the adequate terms for the broader scope
of a merchant's action. Stosch also suggests that "Handelschaft"
presupposes a business of a certain size, territorial scope, and
professionalism." Nonetheless, often, the terms 'Handelschaft'
and 'Kaufmannschaft' would be used synonymously. 09
It is notable that an even more broad term could have been
used for 'commerce'-its German cognate "Commerz" or
"Kommerz" (derived from the Latin "commercium" and in this
form, "das Commercium," also found in German language)."0
During the time of the translation, however, 'Commerz' and
'Kommerz' were not much in use."' In an English-German
107. STOSCH, supra note 105.
108. Id.
109. 1 ADELUNG, supra note 100. Stosch's treatment of the matter is also a sign of the
terms' synonymy, as his task was to correctly tell words apart that were commonly used
interchangeably. STOSCH, supra note 105.
110. All three versions of the cognate had two meanings: a broad one, meaning any
interaction between people, be it social or directed to profit; and a narrow one, referring
to the exchange of goods. See 1 ADELUNG, supra note 100; GOETHE-WORTERBUCH, supra
note 100.
111. 'Commerz' and 'Kommerz' were not much in use, and were even more rarely
invoked when talking about interactions in general. This usage only later became more
frequent, probably due to their frequent usage as a title to denote more noble and
distinguished people, as in "Commercien-rath" or "Commerz-rath." THE ENGLISH
CELLARIUS, supra note 82, only lists "Handel", "Gewerbe" ("business") and
"Bekanntschaft" ("acquaintance") as a translation of "commerce," but not
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dictionary from 1800, Ebers defines 'commerce' as "the
concourse/interaction of one with another,"1 2 expressing a view
similar to Balkin's. However, the German translator did not
choose this locution in his translation of the Constitution.
De Ronde gestures at a more circumscribed understanding
of 'commerce'; his choice of 'koopmanschap' points towards the
actions of 'koopmanen' (merchants). However, while the German
translator had a variety of choices in how to translate 'commerce,'
De Ronde had fewer options. Although 'handelschap,' the Dutch
cognate of the German 'Handelschaft' exists, it does not appear
to have ever been in wide use. The word "koopmanschap"
appears in nine places in Sewel's Compleat Dictionary English
and Dutch, published in 1766, but "handelschap" is not found."'
The translations of 'regulate,' however, run in different
directions. De Ronde chose a Dutch cognate of the English word.
In Dutch, 'regulate' or 'reguleeren' means to subject to imposition
of rules or control, or to supervise.14 However, the German
translator chose the verb 'einrichten,' a somewhat ambiguous
term, which could mean any of: to establish something previously
nonexistent, to furnish something existing, or to establish oneself
somewhere. For comparison, the translator could have used the
word 'regulieren,' meaning to subject something to rules or to
control, now commonly used in the European Union.
While the Dutch translation preserves a narrower notion of
regulation as "making regular" or setting rules for, the German
translation appears to allow the government to establish
commerce where it might not have previously existed. It might be
argued that the Commerce Clause ruling in the constitutional
challenge to the Affordable Care Act, which concerned whether
Congress had the power to force individuals to engage in
commerce, might have had a different result if the German
"Commercium." See also GOETHE-WORTERBUCH, supra note 100 ("Kommerz" &
"Commercium"); 1 ADELUNG, supra note 100, col. 1342 ("Commercium").
112. EBERS, supra note 82, at 23.
113. EGBERT BUYS, A COMPLEAT DICTIONARY ENGLISH AND DUTCH TO WHICH
Is ADDED A GRAMMAR, FOR BOTH LANGUAGES, ORIGINALLY COMPILED BY WILLIAM
SEWEL; BUT Now, NOT ONLY REVIEWED, AND MORE THAN THE HALF PART
AUGMENTED, YET ACCORDING TO THE MODERN SPELLING, ENTIRELY IMPROVED BY
EGBERT BUYS (Amsterdam, Kornelis de Veer 1766).
114. Specifically, "reguleeren" means "[t]o make regular or orderly" as in "to
regulate the course of a river," and also "to subject to legal decisions and rules." See
Reguleeren, VAN DALE DICTIONARY, www.vandale.ni (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).
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translation were the dispositive text.
B. THE PROGRESS CLAUSE
Progress Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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English German Dutch
To promote the Progress Die Aufnahme der 0m den voordgang van
of Science and useful Arts Wissensehaften und weetensehap en nuttige
by securing for limited nttzlichen Konste konsten te bevorderen
Times to Authors and dadureb zu befordern, door (voor bepaalde tyden)
Inventors the exclusive dap er denen Autoren aan de autheurs, en
Right to their respective und Erfindern das uitvinders te verzeekeren
Writings and aussebliessende Recht zu het uit sluitend regt tot
Discoveries.... iDren respectiven hare bysondere sAhriften
Schriften und en ontdekkingen....
Entdeckungen ffr eine
gewisse Zeit
versihert ....
The Progress Clause grants Congress the power to create
copyrights and patents. The text runs in parallel; Congress is
granted the rights to "promote the Progress of Science ... by
securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to
their . .. Writings" and to "promote the Progress of . .. useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive
Right to their . .. Discoveries.""1 5
The general consensus is that "science" referred to learning
or knowledge."' Although the phrase "useful Arts"~ is more
115. See Giles S. Rich, The "Exclusive Right" Since Aristotle, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 217,
224 (2004) ("[The clause] is two subjects- patents and copyrights -rolled into one[;]
'Science' is to be promoted by copyright and 'useful Arts' by patents."); Giles Sutherland
Rich, My Favorite Things, 35 IDEA 1,2(1994) (stating that "ilt was quite clearly intended
by the authors of the Constitution that copyright, not patents, was intended to promote
science, and the province of rights granted to inventors respecting their 'Discoveries was
to promote the 'useful Arts"h); Lawrence B. Solum, Congress's Power to Promote the
Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashroft, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2002).
116. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
EDWARD WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125-26 (2002)) (arguing the purpose of the Clause is
to promote "the progress of 'Science'-by which word the Framers meant learning or
knowledge"); Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 . CAL. L. REV. 797, 819 (2010)
("Intellectual property historians have contended that, at the time of the Iflraming, 'the
Progress of Science' meant learning or knowledge (referring to the goal of copyright)[.");
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ambiguous, scholars generally agree that it referred to
technology,"' although Edward C. Walterscheid interprets
"useful Arts" to mean "helpful or valuable trades.""'
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court "has shied away from fully
defining what constitutes 'the Progress of Science' or 'useful
Arts."'ll9 The Progress Clause notably omits any mention of
protecting the fine arts, such as sculpture, poetry, painting, and
music, which are clearly copyrightable under current statutory
law.
There is a paucity of Founding-era interpretive data on the
Progress Clause. Although Thomas Jefferson wrote at some
length about patents and copyrights, he was not present at the
convention in Philadelphia when the Constitution was drafted.'"
There is no record from the Convention of any debate concerning
the clause.12 ' Indeed, aside from a brief discussion of the clause in
Federalist 43,122 there is very little evidence of how the founders
Rich, My Favorite Things, supra note 115, at 2.
117. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and
Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 115 (1993) ("The 'useful Arts,' what we would now
call applied science or technology, were often distinguished from 'fine arts,' then as now
denoting art that is more aesthetic than practical, such as poetry, painting, sculpture, and
the like."); Lee, supra note 116, at 819; Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1293 (2011)
(stating that "jaIlthough the Framers did not expressly define the term'useful Arts,' usage
at the time indicates that it related to trades utilizing what we would today call
'technology.' Several [Founding-era sources] support the textual inference that "useful
Arts" concerned craft, trade, and industrial activities...." (internal citations omitted) and
"[tihe phrase 'useful Arts' was understood in contradistinction to the eighteenth-century
terms 'polite,' 'liberal,' and 'fine' arts-which related to aesthetic and philosophical
pursuits."); see also Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50,54 (1949).
118. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts:
The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 52 (1994).
119. Lee, supra note 117, at 819.
120. RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (2005).
121. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 2-3 (2002).
122. Madison wrote:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has
been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of the common law. The
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The
public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States
cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of
them have anticipated the decision on this point, by laws passed at the instance
of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). Madison's reference to copyright being a right
at common law in Great Britain was likely a reference to Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr.
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and contemporary readers of the Progress Clause interpreted it.
The Dutch and German translations of the Progress Clause
tend to comport with the dominant academic understanding of
the phrase "science and useful Arts." "Science" was rendered
"Wissenschaften" ("sciences") in German and "wetenschap,"
meaning science, knowledge, or scholarship, in Dutch. "Useful
Arts" in German became "ntitzliche Klinste," indicating the skills
and techniques of industry and craft, and standing in contrast to
"schbne Ktinste" ("the beautiful arts"), which included painting
and poetry. The Dutch translation was similarly rendered "nuttige
konsten"-the useful arts, which excluded the visual arts.
Other language in the Progress Clause has been the subject
of judicial scrutiny. The Progress Clause's phrase "for limited
Times" was at the center of a constitutional challenge to the
Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA") in the 2003 decision
Eldred v. Ashcroft.123 Eldred challenged the CTEA for extending
the copyright term by twenty years, arguing that this extension
violated the constitutional requirement that copyrights be granted
only "for limited Times." The Supreme Court held that even
though the CTEA extended the copyright term by twenty years,
the period of copyright protection' still comported with the
Constitution's requirements because the term was not infinite. 124
The Dutch and German translations suggest a meaning of
"for limited Times" which may slightly differ from the Supreme
Court's interpretation. De Ronde translates the phrase to "voor
bepaalde tyden"-"for some time" or "for certain times."
Similarly, the German is "fir eine gewisse Zeit" -"for a period of
time" or "for a sure/certain time."l 25 Both suggest that in addition
to not being infinite, the term of a patent or copyright may have
to be a specific, particular length of time, not necessarily alterable
2303 (K.B). The holding that there was a copyright at common law in England was
reversed five years later in Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774)1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.). See Malla
Pollack, The Owned Public Domain, 22 HASTINGS CoMM./ENT. L.J. 265, 284 n.92 (2000).
123. 537 U.S. 186.
124. Id. at 208-09.
125. The German 'gewiss' presupposes, as the Latin 'certus,' that the time in some
way is sure (or for the German, that the time is "known," which is the literal translation of
"gewiB"). 'Gewiss,' as a participle that can both serve as an adverb or an adjective, stems
from 'wissen,' ("to know"). In this regard, Grimm can state that only mathematics is
"gewiss" ("certain") as a science. Kruenitz also uses 'gewiss' in the meaning of 'steady,' as
in requiring an artist to have a steady hand ("eine gewisse hand"). See KRUENITZ, supra
note 102.
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in the future, although one could argue that even an extended
term was still for a certain time, and that the certain time had
merely changed. In this vein, the term 'gewisse' is also colloquially
used in the sense of "some time" as opposed to "an infinite time,"
in which case an exactly determined or determinable duration is
not presupposed.
C. THE NECESSARY & PROPER CLAUSE
Necessary & Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
English German Dutch
To make all Laws which Alle Geseize zu machen, Om alle wetten te maker,
shall be necessary and die nhthig und erforderlich die noodig en bequaam
proper for carrying into seyn wcrden, die zullen zyn om teruitvoer te
Execution the foregoing vorhergehende und alle brengen de voorgaande
Powers, and all other andere Gewalt, die kraft magten en alle andere
Powers vested by this dieser Verfassung der machten, gevestigt by
Constitution in the Regierung der Vereinigten deese Constitutie in het
Government of the United Staaten oder einem government van de
States, or in any Department oder Bcamten Verecnigde Staaten of in
Department or Officer derselben ertheilet eenig department of
thereof. worden, in Ausbung zu officiant daarven.
bringen.
The question of what laws are "necessary and proper" for
Congress to make harkens all the way back to the ratification
debates. Anti-Federalists "pejoratively dubbed the Necessary &
Proper Clause 'the Sweeping Clause,' arguing that it granted
dangerously broad and ill-defined powers" to the Federal
Government. 116DIn contrast, "Federalist supporters of the
Constitution . .. insisted that the Necessary and Proper Clause
was not an additional freestanding grant of power, but merely
made explicit what was already implicit in the grant of each
enumerated power."l'e
126. Gary Lawson et al., Raiders of the Lost Clause: Excavating the Buried
Foundations of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY
AND PROPER CLAUSE 1,m1-2 (Gary Lawson et al. eds., 2010).
127. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 155 (2004). The debates at the Philadelphia Convention
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Although Mark Graber pessimistically claimed, "no one,
including the framers, knows the point of the phrase 'necessary
and proper,'"' Robert Natelson argues that contemporary
documents indicate that "necessary and proper" was a legal term
of art frequently used in agency instruments when granting
incidental powers to one's fiduciaries.'29 Indeed, during the
ratification debates, Federalists wrote as though "proper"
indicated that laws must accord with the government's fiduciary
duty to the people.o
The question of what laws were "necessary" quickly became
salient after the Founding, when each branch of government
considered whether Congress had the power to charter a bank.
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Edmond Randolph
interpreted "necessary" in a narrow manner.'"' In contrast,
provide little guidance to the Clause's meaning. The Necessary and Proper Clause was
added to the Constitution by the "Committee on Detail" and never debated prior to the
Convention's final adoption of the Constitution. Id.
128. Mark A. Graber, Unnecessary and Unintelligible, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 167,
168 (1995).
129. Robert Natelson argues the clause "tracks the language found in many
Founding- and pre-Founding-era private agency instruments, which used 'necessary and
proper' or some equivalent to give fiduciary agents incidental powers beyond those
explicitly derived in the instruments." Lawson et al., supra note 126, at 6. See generally
Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52 (Gary Lawson et al. eds., 2010).
Corporate charters also frequently contained "Icilauses similar to the Necessary and
Proper Clause ... to ensure that an organization with limited powers and purposes would
not be frustrated in the essential conduct of its governmentally assigned activities but still
would be confined to its assigned functions." Id. at 7. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 144 (Gary Lawson et al. eds., 2010). Natelson
concluded that, in agency instruments, a provision using the word 'necessary'
"communicated the grant of incidental powers, but no more or less." Natelson, supra, at
76. British administrative law also contemplated "'incidental"' powers, as contrasted with
'principal' powers. See William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power,
122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1750 (2013). Empowering the agent "to act in a 'proper' manner would
signal that the agent was bound by fiduciary responsibilities." Natelson, supra, at 80. In a
governmental context, "the founders frequently used the term 'proper' to refer to the
obligation of each government branch to respect its jurisdictional boundaries." Id. at 89-
90 (citing Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993)). The records
of the Constitutional Convention generally support the interpretation that the founders
understood "necessary and proper" by reference to its contemporaneous legal usage.
Natelson, supra, at 93.
130. Natelson, supra note 129, at 108-09.
131. See BARNETT, supra note 127, at 158-66; Edmund Randolph, Opinion of
Edmund Randolph, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF
THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 89 (M. St.
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Alexander Hamilton took the view that "necessary often means
no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful or conducive
to."l32
When Chief Justice John Marshall ruled on the
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States in 1819, he sided
with Hamilton. To Marshall, "necessary" meant "convenient." 133
Although Marshall weaved flexibility into the notion of necessity,
he suggested that "necessary" laws must still remain incidental in
character.3 Marshall went on to suggest that the term 'proper'
limited Congress to passing laws actually, rather than pre-
textually, aimed at achieving the ends listed among the
enumerated powers.1 35
Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., Gales & Seaton 1832) (hereinafter LEGISLATIVE AND
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY). Madison stated, "[The clause's] meaning must .. . be limited
to means necessary to the end, and incident to the nature of specified powers." The
Founders' Constitution: James Madison, The Bank Bill, House of Representatives, UNIV.
OF CHICAGO, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/print documents/al_8_18s9.html
(last visited Oct. 16,2015). Jefferson similarly interpreted the Constitution to "allow[] only
the means which are 'necessary,' not those which are merely convenient for effecting the
enumerated powers . . . . [T]he [Clonstitution restrained [Congress] to . . . those means,
without which the grant of power would be nugatory." Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of
Thomas Jefferson: Secretary of State, on the Same Subject (Feb. 15, 1791), in LEGISLATIVE
AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 93.
132. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality
of a National Bank, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 97 (1832).
133. Marshall wrote:
[I1n the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that
['necessary'] frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or
useful, or essential to another. To employ the means necessary to an end, is
generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and
not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be
entirely unattainable.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413-14 (1819).
134. Part of Marshall's rationale for holding the bank constitutional was that the
power to charter a bank was not "a great substantive and independent power, which cannot
be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing them."
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411. This conclusion was consistent with Randolph's claim that "[tjo
be necessary is to be incidental." Randolph, supra note 131, at 89. William Baude has
recently argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits the government to exercise
incidental powers but not, in the language of Madison, 'great' powers. See Baude, supra
note 129, at 1749-55.
135. See BARNETT, supra note 127, at 184-89. Marshall wrote:
[S]ound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature
that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to
be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties
assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
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The Dutch and German translations of "necessary" denote a
stronger requirement than Marshall's notion of convenience, just
as the plain text of the English does. De Ronde used the word
'noodig,' meaning "needed" or "demanded." The German
translator chose 'nothig,' 3 6 also meaning "necessary."
The translation of "proper" provides more insight into the
minds of the translators. In the Dutch translation, "proper"
became "bequaam," spelled 'bekwaam' in modern Dutch,
meaning competent, able, or capable.'37 For a law to be "noodig
en bequaam," it would have to be necessary and capable of
achieving the end it sought. This suggests an interpretation of
"necessary and proper" where laws passed under the Necessary
and Proper Clause are constitutional when they are capable of
solving the problems or addressing the situations the enumerated
powers of Congress were designed for.
The German translation used "erforderlich" for proper,
meaning required, requisite to have happen, or "what the
situation demands." The translated phrase as a whole, "nathig
und erforderlich," is thus somewhat redundant-laws must be
"necessary and required." This is a surprising translation because
in the German legal vocabulary there was a non-redundant analog
to the Necessary and Proper Clause that could be found in
contemporary texts: "notwendig und angemessen."
"Angemessen" would mean "proper" in the Aristotelian sense,
ensuring not only the effectiveness of the means, but also that the
means are limited by the goal. In other words, it would not be
"angemessen" for one to crack a nut with a sledgehammer. The
redundant form the translator uses is not necessarily wrong, and
might be understood to have a rhetorical function instead: it
emphasizes that the power given is essentially restricted.
Neither translation evinces an understanding of Natelson's
notion of agency or a sense that "necessary and proper" laws are
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
136. "IN1Othig" stems from the noun "Not," meaning "(strong) need" or
"emergency."
137. 'Bekwaam' outpaces 'bequaam' 38 to 2 in appearances in Sewel's Dictionary,
indicating perhaps De Ronde's old-fashioned tendencies. See Buys, supra note 113. His
upbringing in Gelderland likely contributed to his non-standard spellings and regional
vocabulary. The inventory of his estate indicates that De Ronde read almost exclusively
17th century Dutch religious texts. Rensselaer County Historical Society [New Yorkj
Rensselaer County Surrogate Court records, inventory of the estate of Lambert
DeRonde. 16 February 1796.
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merely laws incidental to laws clearly within the powers of
Congress. This may be because the translators were unfamiliar
with the phrase "necessary and proper" as a term of art.
Nonetheless, the view that a proper law is one which is not pre-
textually related to an enumerated power is somewhat evoked by
the translations "erforderlich" and "bequaam," particularly if one
understands 'bequaam' as indicating that a law is only proper if it
is capable of advancing the ends Congress is permitted to.
Justice Marshall contrasted the language of the Necessary
and Proper Clause with the language prohibiting states from
laying imposts of duties. That language states, "No State shall ...
lay any Imposts of Duties . . . except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection laws."' Because the phrase
"absolutely necessary" appeared elsewhere in the Constitution,
Marshall claimed the "necessity" required by the Necessary and
Proper Clause "need not be absolute" and that the term
"necessary" could be taken "in its ordinary grammatical sense"
and "used in a sense more or less strict." 39
The terms "necessary" and "absolutely necessary" retain
their difference in degree in the German and Dutch translations.
In German, "absolutely necessary" became "unumganglich
ndthig" (uncircumventably necessary). More literally,
'unumginglich' means "unable to be walked around." In Dutch,
it became "absolut noodzakelyk" (absolutely necessary).
De Ronde curiously chose a very close synonym for 'noodig' in
this clause, 'noodzakelyk'. The terms are very often used
interchangeably, but to the extent that there are shades of
difference in meaning, 'noodig' is something which is demanded
or asked for, like a favor, but something that is 'noodzakelyk' is
required, like military service.
138. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
139. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 388.
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D. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Privileges & Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
[Vol. 31:1
English German Dutch
The Citizens of each Die Borger eines jcden De burgers van elk staat
State shall be entitled to Staats sollen zu allen sullen regt hebben tot alle
all Privileges and Vorrechten und voorregten en vryheeden
Immunities of Citizens Freyheiten der Bfirger in van burgers in dc
in the several den verschiedenen onderschydene staaten.
States. Staaten berechtigt seyn.
Writ of Habeas Corpus, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2
English German Dutch
The privilege of the Writ of Das Recht des Habeas De privilegie van het writ
Habeas Corpus shall not be Corpus Befchls soll nicht van habeas corpus, zal
suspended .... aufgehoben werden .... niet opgeschort
worden ....
There are two frequently-encountered interpretations of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. The first is that the clause
merely prevents discrimination between residents and
nonresidents of a state - "the Clause guarantees that non-resident
citizens will have merely the same privileges and immunities that
are guaranteed to resident citizens."' 40 The second is that the
Clause "guarantees a uniform set of substantive privileges and
immunities to citizens of the United States no matter what rights
a particular state constitution might contain."41
140. Douglas G. Smith, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2:
Precursor to Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 890
(1997).
141. Id. See also Chester James Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True
Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 5 (1967). The substantive view is perhaps most famously associated with Corfield v.
Coryell, No. 3,320, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), written by Justice Bushrod
Washington while riding circuit. Justice Washington's interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in Corfield v. Coryell "was long considered the authoritative
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause." David R. Upham, Corfield v.
Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483,
1483 (2005). In Corfield, he claimed that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
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Supreme Court jurisprudence currently treats the Privileges
and Immunities Clause as a non-discrimination clause, preventing
the governments of a state from discriminating against citizens
from other states.'42 Under this interpretation, the phrase
"Privileges and Immunities" does not consist of specific
protections of substantive rights, but rather requires that any
"Privileges and Immunities" granted or recognized by a state are
granted or recognized equally in citizens of that state and of other
states.
One textual question that persists amidst the debate about
the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause concerns the
meaning of terms 'privileges' and 'immunities.' Robert Natelson
several states were "those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature,
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which
have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this
Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign." Corfield, 6 F.
Cas. at 551-52. Among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states were:
IpIrotection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right
to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety[ I . .. Itihe right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in
any other state[] ... to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute
and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes
or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state ....
Id. Many scholars understand Corfield as standing for the proposition that "the privileges
and immunities protected under Article IV are not those graciously accorded to its citizens
by a state of sojourn, but the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens of the several or
United States-the natural, fundamental rights of free men everywhere." Chester James
Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause ofArticle Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 11 (1967). See, e.g., JAMES H. KETNER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 259-60 (1978); Michael
Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-
House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 816-18 (1982); see also MICHAEL KENT
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 123-24 (1986); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-34,
at 529 (2d ed. 1988). For a further discussion of these authors and others' interpretation of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see Upham, supra, at 1487, n.20. David Currie
presents a different interpretation of Corfield-that the decision "concluded no more than
that the clause allowed discrimination against an outsider if the right in question was not
'fundamental."' DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 239, n.12 (1985). Despite Corfield's prominence,
it was in fact one of several decisions that interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause
in a variety of ways. See Upham, supra, at 1498-1510.
142. See Jon David Pheils, Defining the Scope of the Article Four Privileges and
Immunities Clause, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 883, 884-85 (1986). Note the history and
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four of the U.S.
Constitution differs strongly from the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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argues these terms are far from inkblots'43 and arrives at the
meaning of the terms 'privileges' and 'immunities' by looking at
the terms' historic usage. Privilege, as defined in a variety of legal
dictionaries, tended to mean "(1) a benefit or advantage;
(2) conferred by positive law; (3) on a person or place;
(4) contrary to what the rule would be in absence of the
privilege."'" Lay dictionaries reflected the same definition.
Natelson concludes, "Nothing in these definitions identified
privileges with natural rights or natural law. Nor did the
definitions suggest that privileges were necessarily created, as
some have asserted, by the English common law. On the contrary,
the definitions suggest that privileges were departures from the
usual course of common law."l45  Similarly, an immunity
constituted "an exemption, otherwise contrary to law, given to a
person or place by special grant."1 46 Although "privileges and
immunities" were considered grants from the government to
particular, often small, classes of people under early English law,
today several "privileges" and "immunities" could be seen as
natural rights, such as the right to acquire and alienate land.1 47
De Ronde's translation of "privileges" to "voorregten"
143. Natelson argues "'Privilege' was a legal term of art with a clear definition,
elucidated by a large body of Anglo-American case law and commentary. The same was
true, in Isome] degree, of 'immunity."' Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2009). Natelson went on to
criticize Justice Washington's view of Privileges and Immunities as failing to make sense
on both its own terms and as a historical matter, and to note a variety of other
interpretations of the clause: that the Clause protected a general right to travel, that the
"privileges and immunities of citizenship" were the rights specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, and that "privileges and immunities" were "the ancestral privileges of
Englishmen-transferred to Americans through their colonial charters." Id. at 1126. See
also David F. Forte & Ronald Rotunda, Privileges and Immunities Clause, in THE
HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 269 (Edwin Meese, III et al. eds., 2005)
("'Privileges and immunities' constituted a summary of ancient rights of Englishmen that
the colonists fought to maintain during the struggle against the mother country."); Michael
Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-
House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 809-15 (1982) (describing rights granted
in colonial charters and claiming that these "privileges and immunities" amounted to
British constitutional limitations). Natelson rejects these interpretations.
144. Natelson, supra note 143, at 1130-31.
145. Id. at 1132.
146. Id. at 1133. Natelson concludes that the terms 'immunity' and 'privilege'
effectively referred to the same legal concept. Id. at 1133. "Because an immunity was a
benefit, otherwise contrary to law, given to a person or place by special grant, it was a
privilege. A privilege to act in a certain way necessarily implied an exemption from the
normal consequences of so acting-hence, an immunity." Id. at 1134.
147. Id. at 1138-39.
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reflects the notion that privileges were benefits granted by the
state, instead of rights. For "immunities," De Ronde uses
"vryheden" (freedoms), a word that reflects a notion of natural
liberty rather than a special grant by the state. Sewel's Dutch-
English Dictionary from 1766 attests that "voorrecht" is a special
privilege, and that freedom (vryheid) is a more general term.148
Where the term 'privilege' is used in Article 1, Section 9, clause 2,
describing the "privilege of habeas corpus," De Ronde chooses
the cognate "privilegie" to stand in for privilege.
The German translator also gives a meaning to "privileges
and immunities" that is not quite in accord with existing theories,
but which is notably aligned with the meaning evoked in
De Ronde's translation. For "privileges," he uses "Vorrechte,"
meaning a special benefit granted. But for "immunities," he uses
"Freyheiten" (freedoms). "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus," however, becomes the right of habeas corpus-"Das
Recht des Habeas Corpus," now equating "privilege"
("Vorrecht") and the more modern "right" ("Recht").
E. NATURAL BORN CITIZEN
Natural Born Citizen, Art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
English German Dutch
No person except a Niemand ausser cin Geen persoon dan cen
natural born Citizen, or a geborner Buirger, oder ingeebooren burger, of die
Citizen of the United der zu der Zeit, da diese een burger is van de
States, at the time of the Verfassung angenommen Vereenigde Staaten op
Adoption of this wird, ein Burger der den tyd can de adoptie van
Constitution, shall be Vercinigten Statten ist, deese Constitutie, zal
eligible to the Office of soil zu dem Amte cines verkiesbaar zyn tot het
President .... Prisidenten wahilfhig officie van President . ...
seyn ....
Recent presidential elections have raised the question of
what it means to be a "natural born Citizen" eligible to become
President of the United States. The Republican presidential
candidate in 2008, John McCain, was born to American parents in
the Panama Canal Zone in 1936, while his father was on active
148. Buys, supra note 113.
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duty in the U.S. Navy.149 Before McCain, a shadow was also cast
on George Romney's attempt to win the Republican presidential
nomination in 1968; Romney was born in Mexico to U.S. citizen
parents.
There are competing interpretations of the phrase "natural
born Citizen." Gabriel Chin argues that to be a natural born
citizen, one must be a citizen "at the moment of birth," whether
or not that citizenship is acquired under the citizenship clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment or by Congressional statute.1' A
competing view is that one is only a natural born citizen if one is
born within the United States. Under this view, a child who is born
to American citizens abroad is naturalized at birth by statute and
is not a natural born citizen.'52 Still another view holds that the
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not the right
place to look for the definition of "natural born Citizen," as the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed after the Constitution was
adopted, and that the notion of "natural born Citizen" can be
extracted from the common law.1'
Larry Tribe and Ted Olson claim the "natural born Citizen"
language contemplates the inclusion of children of American
citizens, arguing that the clause was inspired by the British
Nationality Act of 1730, which provided that children born abroad
to "natural-born Subjects" of the British crown were "natural-
born Subjects" themselves.'54 In Tribe and Olson's view, the
Natural Born Citizen Clause tracks the existing understanding of
natural born subjects in England, simply substituting the word
"Citizen" for "Subject.""' Larry Solum similarly looks to
149. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President, 107
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 2 (2008), http://repository.law.umich.edulcgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1089 &context=mlr_fi. Much of the debate about John McCain
concerned a statutory question of whether the Canal Zone was within the "limits and
jurisdiction" of the United States, which reaches issues beyond the argument about the
text of this clause.
150. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, McCain's Citizenship and Constitutional Method, 107
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 42, 43 (2008), http://repository.law.umich.edulcgil
viewcontent.cgi?article=1086 &context=mlr-fi.
151. Chin, supra note 149, at 2.
152. See Chin, supra note 149, at 5.
153. Id. at 16.
154. See British Nationality Act, 1730,4 Geo. 2, c. 21; Laurence H. Tribe & Theodore
B. Olson, Opinion Letter, Presidents and Citizenship, 2 J.L. 509, 510 (2012).
155. Tribe & Olson, supra note 154. See also Hennessey v. Richardson Drug Co., 189
U.S. 25, 34-35 (1903).
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Blackstone's discussion of "natural born subjects" as an indication
of what people during the Founding might have looked to in order
to understand the phrase "natural born Citizen."156 However,
Blackstone is "not completely clear or precise.""1 7 Blackstone
states, "Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the
dominions of the crown of England.""' But he also qualifies the
statement, noting "all children, born out of the king's ligeance,
whose fathers were natural-born subjects, are now natural born
subjects themselves, to all intents and purposes."5 9
De Ronde translates "natural born Citizen" to "ingeebooren
burger" (an inborn or innate citizen). As written, De Ronde's
language is close to a word-for-word literal translation of the
English text, but in Dutch the language becomes somewhat
redundant. In Dutch, a 'burger' meant a person who was a citizen
automatically or at birth," as contrasted to a 'porter,' who was a
naturalized citizen."' The different terms arose from a physical
understanding of Dutch cities. At the center of old Dutch cities
was a fort (burg or burcht, the same root existing in the French
adjective bourgeious); the "poort" was the gate into the city. One
156. Lawrence B. Solum, Commentary, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen
Clause, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 23 (2008),
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l846&context=facpub.
157. Id. at 27.
158. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 354
(Oxford, Clarendon 1765-1769), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subjectmenus/
blackstone.asp.
159. Solum, supra note 156, at 27. Other evidence cuts both ways. The first
naturalization act of 1790 provided that "children of citizens of the United States, that may
be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural
born citizens." Id. at 29. On the one hand, this statute could be read as simply codifying
the original meaning of the citizenship clause. On the other hand, it could be seen as setting
a discretionary rule beyond that which a common law notion of "natural born citizen" or
"natural born subject" would include. Id. Given the ambiguous evidence, Solum gestures
towards the 'new originalist"' notion that there can be a point where "interpretation runs
out" and sources beyond the Constitution's text and the original public meaning of the
document must be referenced. See id. at 30.
160. Sewel's 1766 dictionary equates the status of "burger" to one who is free. For the
English word "infranschise," he says, "(or to make a freeman) iemand burger maaaken."
BUYS, supra note 113, at 386. A recent work exploring the history of idea of citizenship in
the Netherlands is JOOST KLOEK & KARIN TILMANS, BURGER: EEN GESCHIEDENIS VAN
HET BEGRIP "BURGER" IN DE NEDERLANDEN VAN DE MIDDELEEUWEN TOT DE 21 STE
EEUW (2002).
161. Cf. Jakobson, supra note 58, at 116 (stating that "languages differ essentially in
what they must convey and not in what they may convey."). Whereas English only has one
term for citizens, Dutch splits the concept into two terms- one for citizens at birth and
another for naturalized citizens.
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thus belonged truly to the center of the city, or one was admitted
from the outside. The choice of "ingeebooren" could indicate
De Ronde's belief that a citizen needed to be born in the United
States, or the entire phrase could simply be understood as an
imperfect attempt to literally translate the English text, as
De Ronde does at many points in the Dutch copy.
The German translation gestures at the broader
interpretation of the Natural Born Citizen Clause, using the
phrase "ein geborner Birger." A Burger belonged to a privileged
group in urban society: he was neither noble nor clergy, but
nevertheless had, unlike the rest of the population,2 certain
freedoms and rights. Although 'Burger' is thus not a perfect
substitute for 'citizen,' it could nevertheless be commonly used in
this way during the eighteenth century, especially when
translating the Latin term 'civis' or the English 'citizen.' Since
Germany was not a republic, a more adequate term was not at
hand. "6
"Ein geborner Birger" then roughly means "a born citizen,"
dropping the term 'natural' entirely. Why did the translator omit
the word 'natural'? One possibility is that the translator believed
the notion of "natural born" was completely captured by
"geborner," that he could not conceive of how someone who was
"born a citizen" would not be a "natural born Citizen," and that
he understood such tautology in the original simply as a rhetorical
clich6. . ..
Ersch-Gruber,'6" an early nineteenth century German
Encyclopedia, includes the statement that "every Son of a Citizen
is a born Citizen,"' which could easily be regarded as
tautological. Naturalization or birth were the only two ways of
162. The so-called "vicrter Stand" (fourth estate).
163. Adelung lists a number of different meanings of the term 'Bfirger." First, a
Btirger is defined as an inhabitant of a city whose inhabitants were allowed to partake in
the freedom the town itself had (the word is traced back to "Burg" ("castle") which is
understood to refer to any fortified place). Second, as the so-called "third estate," in
contrast to the nobles and clergyman. Third, as a translation for the Latin "civis," in a
republic or a comparable form of state. Finally-in a figurative meaning-anyone living in
a town. 1 ADELUNG, supra note 100, at 1263(f).
164. ALLGEMEINE ENCYCLOPADIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN UND KONsTE IN
ALPHABETISCHER FOLGE VON GENANNTEN SCHRIFTSTELLERN BEARBEITET (J.S. Ersch
& J.G. Gruber eds., Leipzig, 1821).
165. Id. at 39 ("Jeder Bilrgersohn ist geborner Birger, fOr Fremde aber ist die
BUrgerannahme mit groBen Schwierigkeiten verbunden").
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becoming a "Blirger," tertium non datur, and due to the blood
principle, a child born oversees would not need to be
naturalized.'" Notably, in German-language discussions of the
Natural Born Citizen clause during the early nineteenth century,
the "natural" is usually omitted." "[Niaturally born" is simply
understood to stand in contrast to the cases of adoption (and the
special case of residence in part of Missouri at the time of the
French cession).'6
F. THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Recess of the Senate, Art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
English German Dutch
The President shall have Der Prasident soll Gewalt De President zal magt
Power to fill up all hahen, alle erledigtc hebben om alle vacante
Vacancies that may Stellen, die sich whrend plaatsen die mogen
happen during the Recess dem, da der Senat nicht voorvallen gcdurende de
of the Senate, by granting sitzt, ereignen mogen, afwccnthyd van de
Commissions which shall dureh Ertheilung der Senaat, op te vullen door
expire at the End of their Commissionen zu commissies te vergunnen
next Session. beseen, welche am Ende welke zullen ophouden
der naehsten Sitzung met het eijnde van haar
desselben aufhren sollen. naast volgende sitting.
In January 2012, President Obama appointed Richard
Cordray to head the newly-created Consumer Financial
166. Similar to the case in the Netherlands, the principle of naturalization sprung
from a Roman legal custom already abolished during the middle ages where unfrec
inhabitants (serfs, etc.) were considered free "a year and a day" after they had arrived -
leading to the saying "Stadtluft macht frci" (breathing city-air sets you free). However,
unlike in Dutch, the German terminology does not differ between "Porter" and "Burger."
There were, however, differences in practice: only the "gesworene Buerger" (the sworn
citizen) had equal rights, and since naturalization usually was bound to the question of
property, in the majority of cases only the second generation (that was then also inborn)
would have reached such status.
167. If, at the time in Germany, the phrase "naturally born" was ever used outside
the context of the United States Constitution, then it was either in a theological context
(distinguishing the natural birth from the rebirth by faith, or contrasting the naturally born
humans from the God-made Adam) or in a medical context (obstetrics).
168. See AMERICA IM JAHRE 1831 at 304 (C. N. Rding ed., Hamburg, Hoffman
1832) (summarizing the U.S. Constitution). A similar omission can be found in another
contemporary work. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, DR. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN's LEI3EN 424
(Weimar, Verlage des Landesindustrie-Comptoirs 1818) (stating "[thc American
Certificate of Naturalization grants foreigners, who have been domestic there for seven
years, all rights of inborn subjects.").
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Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), as well as three other individuals to
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")."9 Cordray's
nomination had been blocked by a Senate filibuster since July
2011.70 The President had acted during what the executive
claimed was a "Recess of the Senate," permitting him to bypass
the requirement to receive the "Consent of the Senate." At the
time of the appointments, the Senate was meeting in pro forma
sessions every three business days from December 20, 2011,
through January 22, 2012, rather than officially ending the
legislative session."' Often the meetings lasted "minutes or even
seconds . . . to meet the definition of holding a Congressional
meeting." 17 2 Senate Democrats had used the same tactic in the
past to prevent President Bush from making recess
appointments. 7 3
The question of whether President Obama's appointments
qualified as occurring "during the Recess" made its way to the
Supreme Court and was answered in June 2014. All nine justices
held that the appointments were unconstitutional, however they
disagreed on why. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer held
that the term "the Recess" includes both the intersession recess
between Senate sessions and "an intra-session recess of
substantial length." 74 The majority understood the purpose of the
clause as preventing governmental action from grinding to a halt
during the Senate's extended absence.'7 ' As the D.C. Circuit
noted in the same case, "[a]t the time of the Constitution,
intersession recesses were regularly six to nine . .. months . .. and
senators did not have the luxury of catching the next flight to
Washington.""' Although the President could hypothetically
169. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints
Consumer Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/
richard-cordray-named-consumer-chief-in-recess-appointment.html.
170. Id.
171. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
172. Cooper & Steinhauer, supra note 169.
173. Id.
174. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,2561 (2014).
175. Id. at 2565-66 ("IThe framers might have expected that the Senate would meet
for a single session lasting at most half a year."). Id. at 2598 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tihe
majority contends that the Clause's supposed purpose of keeping the wheels of
government turning demands that we interpret the Clause to maintain its relevance in light
of [new circumstances].").
176. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 503 (citing Michael B. Rappaport, The Original
Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1498 (2005)).
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exercise the recess appointments power during an intra-session
break of the Senate, the Court deemed the three-day break at
issue was too short to constitute a break that would activate the
recess appointments power."' In contrast, Justice Scalia's
concurrence maintained that the term "the Recess" could only
refer to the single intersession recess that occurred between
formal legislative sessions."' "[I]f 'the next Session' denotes a
formal session, then "the Recess" must mean the break between
formal sessions."1 7 9
Although most of the German translation of the Constitution
is literal, the Recess Clause is paraphrased. "[Diuring the recess
of the Senate" became "da der Senat nicht sitzt"-"when the
Senate is not sitting." In the same manner the German translator
circumscribes "recess" in art. II, § 2, cl. 3. De Ronde translates the
recess clause to "gedurende de afweezenthyd van de Senaat"-or
"during the extended absence of the Senate." In other Dutch
documents from the period, the word 'afweezenthyd' is used when
an official or member of royalty is absent from a place for months
or years, such as when one is on an extended trip abroad. In this
sense, it is different from the modern Dutch 'afwezigheid' which
refers more generally to one's absence, or to one being merely
"not present," such as when one does not attend a business
meeting. De Ronde's choice of 'afweezenthyd' indicates that he
interpreted the original to mean that the absence was more than
immediate or temporary, but extended.
The Dutch translation gestures at the underlying purpose of
the Recess Appointments Clause-to give the President the
power to get work done when the Senate was absent for an
extended period of time and, by extension, could not approve a
candidate. Because of the difficulty and slow pace of travel in the
late eighteenth-century, senators would literally be unable to
approve nominees when they left the Capitol to return to their
home states. The Recess Clause would have allowed the President
to temporarily fill vacancies during periods when the senators
were absent for an extended period of time.
In contrast, the German translation brings less clarity to the
Noel Canning question. The definite article-"the Recess"-is
177. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2566.
178. Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 2596 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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absent from the German translation. And the eighteenth-century
German distinction between 's6ance' and 'session'-the former
meaning the individual meeting, the latter the longer period of
time convened, including adjournments-does not provide much
guidance because "to sit" is the root of both nouns.
Nonetheless, the German translator's choices can contribute
to the discussion. Although he uses "sitting" in the sense of
"s6ance" in art. I, § 3, cl. 6, his understanding of the word 'recess'
becomes more clear when paraphrasing it in art. I, § 3, ci. 2. In that
clause, "recess" is understood as the interim period after the
assembly has parted ("wihrend der Zeit, da . . .
auseinandergegangen ist") until the next "coming-together" (the
literal meaning of "Zusammenkunft"). However, only so much
can be read into this phrasing, because the translator also uses
"Zusammenkunft" in the case of adjournment."'
G. FELONY
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
English German Dutch
They shall in all Cases, Sic sollen in allen Fillen, Zum' zullen in alle
except Treason, Felony Hochverrath, gevallen, uitgezondert
and Breach of the Peace, Hauptverbrechen und van verraad, dood
be privileged from Friedensbruch waerdige misdaad en
Arrest .... ausgenommen, von verbrekinge van vreede,
Arresttirung wahrend het voorregt hebben om
dem .... niet gearresteerd te
worden ....
180. "Session is the row of meetings until an Ajournement, therefore Session and
S6ance (Sitzung) are not to be confused." 1 DE LA CROIX, VERFASSUNG DER
VORNEHMSTEN EUROPAISCHEN UND DER VEREINIGTEN
AMERIKANISCHEN STAATEN 320 (1792). Adelung also understands "session" not as
a single meeting, but as longer period ("Sitzungsperiode"), whereas the single meeting, in
contrast, is called "sdance." See ADELUNG, supra note 100. Our translator seems to
follow this distinction by translating "Sitzung" as "session." An interpretative decision on
what is meant by "Recess" is however avoided by using a verb instead of a noun, thereby
creating an ambivalence, since "to sit" is the verb form both of "s6ance" and "session."
181. U.S. CONST. (German), supra note 1, art. II, § 3.
182. "Zu" should be "ze" ("they"). There is no word 'zu' in Dutch.
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Art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
English German Dutch
To define and punish Secrtubercy und Om te bepalen en te
Piracies and Felonies Hauptverbrechen, die auf straffen zeerooverien en
committed on the high der offenen See begangen doodwaardige misdaaden
Seas.... werden.... gepleegt op de hooge
zee....
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
English German Dutch
A Person charged in any Wenn jemand in einem Een persoon in cenige
State with Treason, Staate des Hochverraths, staat heschuldight van
Felony, or other Crime, eines Haupt- oder andern verraad, felony of andere
who shall flee from Verbrechens beschuldigt misdaad, die van dejustitie
Justice .... wird, und der Gercchtigkeit zoude vlieden ....
entflichet....
The term 'felony' has had a very broad and frequently
changing meaning. Writing in 1823, Massachusetts lawyer and
legislator Nathan Dane wrote in his treatise on American law,
"[T]he word felony, in the process of many centuries, has derived
so many meanings from so many parts of the common law, and so
many statutes in England, and has got to be used in such a vast
number of different senses, that it is impossible to know precisely
in what sense we are to understand this word."' Although
felonies were traditionally punished by forfeiture of property or
death under the common law in England, " in America at the time
of Dane's writing, there were "many felonies, not one punished
183. 6 NATHAN DANE, DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 715 (Boston, Cummings,
Hilliard & Co. 1823).
184. See Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early
American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461, 463-65 (2009).
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with forfeiture of estate, and but a very few with death.""'
Blackstone similarly explained, "Felony, in the general
acceptance of our English law, comprises every species of crime,
which occasioned at common law the forfeiture of lands or
goods."'"
For "felony," the German translator chose the word
"Hauptverbrechen." In the present day, the term is no longer in
use.'8 In the tradition of the early penal codes and its
translations,'" it meant "head crime"- one automatically
punished by death, usually decapitation.'" Like the English term
'felony,' 'Hauptverbrechen' had already experienced a
considerable semantic shift in Germany by the late eighteenth
century, and the translator could have intended the term to
encompass a variety of meanings. Most likely, he intended a more
modern meaning, since fundamental changes in the penal system
had already severed the direct link between the gravity of the
offense and the punishment."' The secondary meaning "Haupt-"
always possessed outside the field of criminal law ("main") had
largely replaced the primary meaning ("capital") even in the field
of penal law.' 9' In contract law, "Haupt-Pflicht" ("capital duty")
was already understood to be the main duty of a party, and in the
Field of Ethics, "Haupttugend" ("capital virtue") could stand in
for "Kardinaltugend" ("cardinal virtue").192 When Campe's
Dictionary defines "Hauptverbrechen" in 1808, there is no
explicit reference made to the death-penalty. Instead the term is
185. 6 DANE, supra note 183, at 715.
186. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at 94. See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th
ed. 2009) (defining 'felony,' at common law, as "an offense for which conviction results in
forfeiture of the defendant's lands or goods (or both) to the Crown, regardless of whether
any capital or other punishment is mandated.").
187. A cognate of 'Hauptverbrechen,' 'Kapital-Verbrechen' might still be found,
especially as a layman's term. Another term frequently used today is 'Haupttat,' also
translating to "capital crime," but which is presently used to distinguish the crime of the
main perpetrator from that of the accessory.
188. The Latin "res capitalis" and "pecccatum mortale" would usually translate as
"Haupt[-J" or "Capital-Verbrechen."
189. For example, the "Constituito Criminalis Carolina" of 1532 was colloquially
called "Halsgerichtsordnung" ("throat criminal code") since the usual punishment in the
Carolina was death.
190. A key change in Germany was to render punishment that was not only adequate
to the crime committed, but also appropriate in light of a perpetrator's individual level of
guilt. See generally ERNST CHRISTIAN WESTPHAL, DAS CRIMINALRECHT (Leipzig, 1785).
191. See 2 JOACHIM HEINRICH CAMPE, WORTERBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN SPRACHE
572 (Braunschweig, Schulbuchhandlung 1808) ("Hauptverrath").
192. 2 ADELUNG, supra note 100, at 1019 ("Haupttungend").
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defined as "a grand, grave crime (capital crime),"'93 although
German legal scholars of the early nineteenth century would still
have to debate what was meant when interpreting a law that uses
the term.'" When Johann Joachim Eschenburg used the term in
1783, he stated that the usual punishment for murder, as a capital
crime, was banishment, a statement which would be contradictory
if "Hauptverbrechen" required the death penalty.1 95
Evidence that such semantic shift was taking place is
particularly visible in a German translation of the proposed
Seventh Amendment (which became codified as the Fifth
Amendment) from the early 1800s. The phrase "capital, or
otherwise infamous crime" is simply translated as "Haupt-
Verbrechens," illustrating that the term could serve as a
translation for both "capital crimes" in the literal sense, and those
crimes that are "as infamous" as such crimes.196
In the Dutch translation, despite the allegedly amorphous
meaning of 'felony,' De Ronde used a strikingly unambiguous
term in translation. De Ronde translated "felony" to
"doodwaardige misdaaden" - literally, "crimes worthy of death"
(except in art. IV, § 2, where he curiously says "felony," without
translation). De Ronde's choice particularly suggests that despite
the vague meaning of 'felony' before and after the Founding,
some individuals might have still understood it as having a clear,
193. CAMPE, supra note 191 ("Hauptverbrechen").
194. For example, in Bavaria in 1856, the question arose of whether "capital crimes"
in the Bavarian Criminal Code of 1813 meant only those crimes that were punished with
death. See BLATTrER FOR RECHTSANWENDUNG ZUNACHST IN BAYERN (Johann Adam
Seuffert & Ernst August Seuffert eds., Erlangen, Palm & Enke 1856). At first glance, this
debate might point against the modern use. However, the text presumes that people
(already) used the term in the more modern sense of "severe crime"-this being the reason
why there was need for the debate at all.
195. JOHANN JOACHIM ESCHENBURG, HANDBUCH DER KLASSISCHEN LITERATUR
(Berlin, Nicolai 1783). Eschenburg's subject is Greek antiquity, so it does not say much
about the use of "Hauptverbrechen" in a more modern legal context. Nevertheless it is
significant that the author can use the term in such context (meaning for a crime that was
not generally punished with death) without being contradictory.
196. See GESEZE DER REPUBLIK PENNSYLVANIEN, IN UBERSEZTEN AUSZOGEN.
ENTHALTEND DIE BRAUCHBAREN OFFENTLICHEN GESEZE BIS ZU DEM JAHR 1805,
EINSCHLIESSLICH: So WIE AUCH DIE REGIERUNGS-VERFASSUNGEN DER VEREINIGTEN
STAATEN UND VON PENNSYLVANIEN, HRG. UNDER AUTHORITAT EINES GESEZES DER
GENERAL-ASSEMBLY, PASSIRT IM APRIL, 1805, at xx-xxii (Reading, Gedruckt und
Herausgegeben von Johann Ritter und Carl Kessler 1807), http://modern-
constitutions.de/US-00-1787-09-17-de-a-1789-1-e.html. Two other nineteenth century
translators of the U.S. Constitution into German completely omit the word "capital" in
their translations. See 1 DIPPEL, supra note 1, at 84 n.6.
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narrow meaning-namely, a capital crime.
H. HIGH CRIMES & MISDEMEANORS
Art. II, § 4.
[Vol. 31:1
English German Dutch
The President, Vice Der Prisident, Vice- De President, Vice-
President, and all civil Prisident und alle President en alle
Officers of the United burgerliche Beamtc der burgelyke officianten van
States, shall be removed Vercinigten Staaten sollen de Vercenigde Staaten
from Office on ihres Amtes entsetzt zullen afgezet worden van
Impeachment for, and werden, wenn sic wegen haar officie, op cen
Conviction of, Treason, Hochverraths, impeachment voor, en
Bribery, or other high Bestechung oder anderer overtuigen van, verraad,
Crimes and hohen Verbrechen und bribery, of andere sware
Misdemeanors. Ucbelthaten Offentlich misdaaden en
angeklagt und davon wangedragingen.
uberfuhret werden.
The phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is, at first
glance, fairly opaque. A clue to its meaning comes from
Blackstone, who distinguished "high treason" from "petit
treason." Petit treason included breaches of "private and
domestic" allegiances.'97 High treason constituted crimes against
society as a whole.1 98 Following on this distinction, Raoul Berger
explained that the English treated "high crimes and
misdemeanors" as "a category of political crimes against the
state."'" Berger's analysis claimed "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" included misapplication of funds, abuse of official
power, neglect of duty, encroachment upon parliamentary
prerogatives, corruption, betrayal of trust, and giving pernicious
advice to the Crown.200 Berger concludes, "[t]he phrase 'high
Crimes and Misdemeanors,'. . . is not concerned with 'high' in the
sense of 'serious' crimes as such, but with misconduct by officials
in high places who are immune to ordinary forms of judicial or
197. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 158, at 75.
198. See Gary L. McDowell, "High Crimes and Misdemeanors": Recovering the
Intentions of the Founders, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 626,638 (1999) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 158, at 75,203).
199. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 64 (1974).
200. Id. at 71-73.
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political control." 20' Michael Gerhardt similarly reads "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" as "not limited to indictable offenses,
but rather includ[ing] great offenses against the federal
government."202
The German translator writes "hohen Verbrechen und
Uebelthaten," or "high Crimes and Misdeeds," where 'hohen'
most literally means high (as in altitude). The German text is
much more ambivalent here than in the case of
"Hauptverbrechen" and more complex than the English and
Dutch prints. The choice of the German translator to use "hoch"
("high") in this passage, together with his choice in art. III, § 3, cl.
1, to substitute "Treason" with "Hochverrath" ("high treason"),
tracks Blackstone's distinction between high and petit treason.
But although "Hochverrat" ("high treason") in contemporary
German was understood to denote treason, directed against the
state or its head,203 this understanding is muddied by the fact that
'high' and 'capital' were sometimes used as synonyms in the late
eighteenth-century legal discourse.204NOt only could 'high' and
'capital' both refer to the seriousness of the crime, as already
presumed in the case of "felony" ("Haupt-Verbrechen"), but
"Haupt-" could, as in the case of treason, be used to denote
offences against the state and its leader, with the consequence that
the term 'Hauptverrath' and 'Hochverrath' become
interchangeable in this semantic context.205 Campe's Dictionary
from 1808 accordingly lists both possibilities when explaining
"Hochverbrechen" ("high crime"): the broader meaning of "a
grave or exceptional crime," and the more narrow meaning of
"crime directed against the state or its head." 206
201. Thomas I. Emerson, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 131, 133 (1974) (reviewing BERGER, supra note 199).
202. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 1044)5 (2d
ed. 2000). "[Dlelegates to state ratification conventions often referred to impeachable
offenses as 'great' offenses, and. . . frequently spoke of how impeachment should apply if
the official 'deviates from his duty' or if he 'dare to abuse the powers vested in him by the
people."' Id (some internal quotation marks omitted).
203. See 1 ADELUNG, supra note 100 (defining 'Hochverrath' as a treason directed
against the state or its head).
204. A legal example is again the case of treason, where "high treason" (Hoch-verrat)
and "capital treason" (Haupt-Verrath) were understood to be synonymous. See id.
("Haupt-verrath").
205. See 2 CAMPE, supra note 191, at 572 ("Haupt-verrath").
206. 2 CAMPE, supra note 191, at 753 ("Hochverbrechen"). Campe also lists both
possible meanings for 'hochverrat' (high treason). See id.
492016]
50 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY
These usages in mind, it might be prudent not to read too
much intent into the German translation of "high Crimes," since
there is a general tendency of the draft's German translator to
translate as literally as possible, and hereby to choose a cognate
or even use an Anglicism, without giving much thought to the
question of whether the cognate in the individual case would be
the most appropriate German term to stand in for the original
term. So, although the specific definition of "high treason" in the
German system and its deliberate choice by the translator could
accord with a translator's intention to evoke Blackstone's notion
of high crime rather than petit crime (a distinction that even had
found its way into Kruenitz's Encyclopedia 20 7 during the early 19th
century), the possible synonymy of 'high' and 'capital' may render
the German translator's verbatim choice less significant. In the
case of our translator and his tendency for verbatim translation,
this could even be much more likely the case; his literal translation
of "high" could simply be an example of where the German
translator translated in a rote manner.
In Dutch, De Ronde says, "wangedragingen," for
"misdemeanors," meaning "misconducts" or "misbehaviors."
However "high Crimes" emerges in De Ronde's Dutch as "sware
misdaaden" -"serious crimes." De Ronde's translation likely
says more about the public's understanding of the phrase "high
Crimes" than about whether Berger and Gerhardt correctly
identified the phrase's origins. De Ronde was not a lawyer and
could easily have been unaware of Blackstone and other sources
that distinguish between high and petit treason. The translation of
"high Crimes" then presents a particularly stark example of how
the intent of the authors of the Constitution might significantly
deviate from the publicly-understood meaning of the phrase.
Supposing that "high Crimes" was meant to evoke a crime against
the state, De Ronde's translation illustrates that some members
of the Founding-era public may have understood the language to
simply mean "serious crimes" as opposed to minor or
unimportant crimes.
This observation is particularly notable in light of John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport's proposition that the lay
public would have recognized legal language in the Constitution
207. Kruenitz remarks that "the English" make a distinction between "high" and
"petty treason." See KRUENITZ, supra note 102 ("Hochverrath").
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and refrained from coming to a judgment about its meaning.
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that
It is a common, if not universal, reaction for a layperson to read
a legal document, whether a contract, statute, or a constitution,
and have the following reaction: "Well, it seems to mean X to
me, but I am not a lawyer. To be sure of its meaning, I will need
a lawyer to read it." . . .This example suggests that the linguistic
practice of the community would give priority to legal
interpretive rules and to the lawyer's understanding of legal
documents, such as the Constitution.208
De Ronde's translation suggests that at least some members
of the educated, Founding-era public might not have always
recognized each of the legal or specialized terms in the
Constitution. As a result, they may have developed their own
interpretations of the language and failed, as De Ronde did, to
defer to a lawyer's interpretation. Alternatively, one might
imagine that De Ronde did not have the opportunity to
corroborate his interpretation and was not actually subjectively
certain of the Constitution's meaning on this point. This view is
possible given De Ronde's preference for using cognates instead
of locutions to express American legal concepts.2" On the other
hand, it might also be implausible to suppose that De Ronde
translated and published a text that he affirmatively believed
might be incorrect.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed two Founding-era translations of
the United States Constitution and considered their usefulness as
a means of interpreting the Constitution's text. Our exegesis
illustrates that the translations provide useful insight, but are also
limited in significant ways.
Because translation presupposes interpretation, the
particular choices of the translators can be understood as
Founding-era commentaries on the Constitution. Commentary is
not only present where the translators paraphrased or even chose
to substitute a technical term with an extended explanation.
Rather, the translator's choice of words and sentence structure
208. JOHN 0. McGINNIs & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 126 (2013).
209. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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itself inherently reflects analysis. The fact that languages are far
from isomorphic, that in a large number of cases the translator
had the option or need to choose from among many terms or
phrases with varied meanings, sheds light on how a member of the
Founding-era public would have understood the English-
language text. Indeed, the examples we treated in this paper
collectively illustrate a range of views that the Founding-era
public might have had about the content of the Constitution.
Our discussion also highlighted a number of limitations
present when using the Founding-era translations as an
interpretive tool. The issues range from how authoritative a
translator's understanding of a legal text can be, to how conscious
the translator was of the nuanced meaning of his choices. While
these issues are significant, the translations still can serve as a
piece of the interpretive puzzle and add to our understanding of
the Constitution as a whole. Despite any ambiguities and
disagreements, the translations provide additional evidence of the
Constitution's original public meaning and ought to stand
alongside contemporary news articles, commentaries, convention
notes, and dictionary definitions.
The limitations of using translations to interpret the original
text are most clearly apparent in those cases where our translators
disagree on the meaning of a passage. Whereas De Ronde's
translation of "regulate" preserves the idea of regulation as
"making regular," the German translation appears to allow the
government greater latitude to establish commerce where it might
not have previously existed. De Ronde's notion of "proper" laws
concerns whether they achieve their ends, whereas the German
translator's "proper" law is merely a required one. Although the
German translations of "high Crimes" and "felony" track the
dominant academic and contemporary understanding of the
terms, De Ronde's translations deviate sharply from those
interpretations. His translation of "high Crimes" evokes severity
rather than a crime against the state; similarly, his translation of
"felony"-"crime worthy of death"-is both highly specific and at
odds with existing English and American law.
Such semantic dissociation between the two translations can
be understood as either an example of differing interpretations,
or as a contingent result of the translation process as a more or
less conscious and controlled activity that inevitably leads to
differences and even errors. The latter possibility might often be
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the case with these translators' work. The fact that even within
their own translations, certain terms are not applied in a
consistent way calls into question the usefulness of understanding
every word-choice as an interpretative argument. It is also worth
recognizing that agreement between the translators does not
necessarily indicate their interpretation reflected that of the rest
of the Founding-era public. Agreement could spring from a
consensus on the meaning of a respective passage, but could also
simply be a case of coincidence. Concord in these cases does
nevertheless have a significant heuristic value: there is a good
chance that the translations agree with each other for a reason.
Coupled with the translations' historic value, these insights render
the Founding-era translations of the United States Constitution
an invaluable source for constitutional scholars and lawyers
today. For too long, they languished in obscurity-now they may
be read, criticized, and reinterpreted.

